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Every law, when probed and prodded, tells a story about its historical 
trajectory, a nonlinear transformation with neither a definitive beginning nor an 
end. The ensuing legal history is an insightful glimpse into a law’s past that is likely 
unfamiliar—perhaps even unexpected. That legal narrative may not be relevant to 
present-day legal concerns, or it may have immediate resonance to a contemporary 
dilemma. In either case, it may be exploited by legal actors in pursuit of an agenda. 
For a legal historian, the challenge is to tell the story of a law while resisting 
attempts to simplify or to exploit the complexities of history. 
The story I will tell here focuses on legal norms of wife-initiated (and 
acquired) divorce in Jewish and Islamic legal systems in the late antique and 
medieval eras.1 The received tradition narrates a woman’s minimal agency in 
divorce—in both Jewish and Islamic law—as intrinsic.2 It is widely known—or 
presumed—that Jewish and Muslim women have relatively less access to divorce 
than their male counterparts in present-day Jewish and Islamic courts.3 In both 
traditions, women can encounter difficulties in obtaining divorces.4 Combining 
documentary and literary-legal sources, this Article presents evidence that Jewish 
and Muslim women in the late antique period had relatively more access to 
divorce than women in the medieval era.5 I argue that changes in women’s divorce 
 
1. I narrate this story in two voices: the text of this Article for the general reader and most 
(though not all) of the footnotes for the specialist reader. 
2. The reader may wonder what motivates this particular focus on Jewish and Islamic legal 
systems, or why Christian legal systems are not represented in this study. This research was built 
around a specific point of intersection between these two legal systems, which is explored in infra 
Section IV, Disenchanting the Orthodox Narratives. 
3. “The ruling now prevalent is that a woman initiating divorce proceedings according to 
Jewish law is required to submit a ground, chosen from a defined list appearing in the Talmud; 
barring such a ground, the husband cannot be coerced to grant a divorce.” Elimelech Westreich, The 
Rise and Decline of the Law of the Rebellious Wife in Medieval Jewish Law, in XII JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION 
STUDIES (ZUTPHEN CONFERENCE) 207 (Hillel Gamoran ed., 2002). Generally, in modern states that 
apply Islamic laws in some form, Muslim women are able to secure a divorce if (a) they can establish 
specific, judicially accepted grounds or (b) they relinquish their dower rights and negotiate a husband’s 
consent. (Exceptions to this general situation are Egypt and Tunisia, which do not require the 
husband’s consent.) See Islamic Law Project, Legal Profiles, EMORY UNIV. SCH. LAW (2002), available at 
http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/index2.html. 
4. For a discussion of the Jewish chained wife (the agunah, a woman unable to obtain a divorce 
decree), see 1 BERNARD S. JACKSON, AGUNAH: THE MANCHESTER ANALYSIS (2011). By way of 
example, see a modern United States case, Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983), which 
found enforceable a Jewish marital agreement requiring fulfilment of Jewish divorce laws. See also 
MICHAEL J. BROYDE, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND THE ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH LAW: A 
CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGUNAH PROBLEMS IN AMERICA (2001). In this Article, I 
translate get as divorce decree. On some of the difficulties encountered by Muslim women seeking 
divorces and contemporary legislation pertaining to it, see Oussama Arabi, The Dawning of the Third 
Millennium on Shari'a: Egypt’s Law No. 1 of 2000, or Women May Divorce at Will, 16 ARAB L.Q. 2 (2001). 
See also Muhammad Munir, Judicial Law Making: An Analysis of Case Law on Khulʿ in Pakistan (Apr. 
5 2012) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2034964. However, during my 
relatively recent legal-ethnographic research (sponsored by a Fulbright grant) of Jordan’s Islamic 
courts, I did not observe judges restricting women from initiating or obtaining divorces; the main 
challenge women faced was receiving alimony and child support payments, not divorces. 
5. While some feminists and some religious reformers may find that this Article resonates 
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options are manifestations of multidimensional historical processes that illustrate 
law’s profoundly contingent contexts.6 Divorce in Jewish and Islamic legal systems 
underwent parallel transformations between the late antique (roughly, 250–800 
CE) and medieval (roughly, 800–1450 CE) periods as the result of common socio-
political and jurisprudential dynamics. By placing Jewish law and Islamic law into 
historical conversation with each other, this Article challenges the norm of 
studying these legal systems from a primarily internal perspective. In addition, this 
Article resists the conventional heuristics of comparative legal studies by replacing 
notions of “influence” or “transplant” with recognition of parallel legal changes 
and shared legal culture. 
Legal communities use narratives to illustrate legal rules and also create 
“internal” narratives about their legal systems that have normative consequences. 
The analysis presented here establishes that any statement of “what the law is ” is 
embedded within a complex historical narrative generated by jurists. Jewish and 
Muslim jurists construct internal narratives that are ahistorical and legitimate their 
own authority; I identify these narratives as “orthodox” and illustrate how they are 
espoused by both historical actors and contemporary scholars.7 This Article 
employs historicism and thick descriptions of law to challenge those orthodox 
narratives.8 Influencing the outcome of those discussions, in terms of specific legal 
norms, is not my objective here.9 Rather, the underlying aim of this piece is to use 
historicism to challenge the legal authority of authoritarian groups.10 The narration 
 
with or lends support to their own objectives, this is an unintended consequence of exploring the 
legal narrative. It should be noted that this is merely one case study and the stories of other laws may 
reveal a past that corresponds to very different values and expectations. Instead of advocating for a 
specific doctrinal change, this Article intends to illuminate aspects of Islamic and Jewish legal history 
that remain unappreciated. See CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY, FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS: 
DECOLONIZING THEORY, PRACTICING SOLIDARITY (2003) (explaining that feminist strategies are 
not homogenous). 
6. As Foucault notes, “The purpose of history is to dissipate, not discover, the roots of our 
identity.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT READER 95 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984). 
7. As I use orthodoxy in this Article, it is entirely unrelated to contemporary terminology 
(such as modern Orthodox Judaism). Instead, orthodox simply means the existence of a (hierarchical) 
group or institution that is able to label certain religious groups or practices as heretical. 
8. By historicism, I mean specifically post-foundationalist, radical historicism. See Mark Bevir, 
What is Genealogy?, 2 J. PHIL. HIST. 263 (2008) [hereinafter Bevir, What is Genealogy?] (explaining radical 
historicism). Radical historicism is distinct from general historicist approaches. See Mark Bevir, Why 
Historical Distance Is Not a Problem, 50 HIST. & THEORY 24 (2011). Moreover, the critical component of 
this project is not historicism, but rather the regional, non-reified narrative of near eastern legal 
history (the “interwoven” narrative that I present in Section V) that subverts conventional 
assumptions. 
9. I intentionally abstain from modern and anachronistic conclusions. This is an ethical stance 
in opposition to the totalizing project of modernity. See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF 
RELIGION (1993). 
10. Similarly, Abou El Fadl has described some of his scholarly work as pursuing a 
demonstration of historical malleability. He noted, “By presenting the diversity within the legal 
discourse, I hoped to demonstrate the inability of the authoritarian to dominate and establish 
uniformity over certain issues in Islamic legal history.” KHALED M. ABOU EL FADL, AND GOD 
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of legal changes outlined in this Article is just one exploration into the shared 
nomos of Jewish and Islamic legal systems and the socio-political struggles over law 
within it.11 
Recent, increased scholarly attention to the role of religion in the public 
sphere has invigorated legal discussions of the (in)compatibility of modern law 
and religious law. But these debates in contemporary public discourse tend to 
ossify religious legal systems and to authorize certain voices over others. It is not 
my intention to accommodate religion to neoliberal values, or to discover the lost 
purity or goodness of religion, or even to denounce religion. These normative 
strategies are frequently counterproductive because they reify religion and 
subscribe to a false religious-secular dichotomy.12 This Article challenges the terms 
of contemporary debates by highlighting the dissimilar voices within religious legal 
systems and by problematizing the monolithic conceptualization of “religious law” 
that underlies current controversies. Indeed, the plurality of legal opinions within 
each legal system and the diversity of legal practices among Muslims and Jews 
attest to the density of these normative spaces. The forces of change in these two 
“religious” legal systems are not so different than in any other legal system; it is 
the “law” aspect of these normative orders, rather than the “religion” aspect, that 
is my emphasis because legal analysis is essential to understanding both Jewish and 
Islamic legal systems. 
This Article analyzes historical evidence of both Jewish and Muslim women 
divorcing their husbands in late antiquity (roughly, 250–800 CE) and offers some 
provisional explanations for why women’s divorce options became more limited 
between 800 and 1450 CE). This case study indicates that comparative legal 
history—as implemented in this Article—illuminates dynamics of legal change 
that would otherwise remain unnoticed. Studying a legal system in isolation from 
its context, which includes contiguous legal systems, obscures expansive and long-
term changes. Instead, by plotting parallel changes over time in divorce practices 
among Jews and Muslims in the “Near East,” this Article demonstrates that legal 
orthodoxy is not timeless or uniform.13 Jewish and Islamic divorce laws tell stories 
 
KNOWS THE SOLDIERS: THE AUTHORITATIVE AND AUTHORITARIAN IN ISLAMIC DISCOURSES 35 
(2001). 
11. On nomos, see Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
(I thank Michael A. Helfand for suggesting the relevance of Cover’s article.) See also Judith Resnik, 
Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17 
(2005). 
12. Fitzgerald explains, “The concept of ‘a religion’ and its pluralization ‘religions’ is a modern 
category, has a specific set of historical conditions for its emergence . . . and is a fundamental part of 
modern Western ideology.” Timothy Fitzgerald, Introduction to RELIGION AND THE SECULAR: 
HISTORICAL AND COLONIAL FORMATIONS 1, 6 (Timothy Fitzgerald ed., 2007). 
13. The “Near East” (and its modern equivalent, the “Middle East”) is a problematic political, 
rather than geographic category. Indeed, “The Middle East exists because the West has possessed 
sufficient power to give the idea substance. In this regard the colonial past and imperial present are 
parts of the equation that make the Middle East real.” Michael Ezekiel Gasper, Conclusion: There Is a 
Middle East!, in IS THERE A MIDDLE EAST?: THE EVOLUTION OF A GEOPOLITICAL CONCEPT 231, 
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that are sporadic, unpredictable, and barely audible under the faux euphony of 
orthodoxy. 
I. DEFINING WIFE-INITIATED DIVORCE14 
It is widely presumed that men have unlimited access and women have 
restricted access to initiate divorce in both Jewish and Islamic law.15 This 
presumption, however, simplifies a complicated historical process—only part of 
which I will briefly explore here—in which a woman’s access to divorce changed 
over time. I will focus primarily on jurisprudential texts and only secondarily on 
how these jurisprudential ideas were actually implemented because the surviving 
documentary sources make it difficult to reconstruct exactly what kind of access to 
divorce women—both Muslim and Jewish—had in the late antique and medieval 
periods.16 In what follows, I will present two concise chronologies of Jewish legal 
changes and Islamic legal changes in women’s access to divorce. 
I will intentionally not differentiate between a wife’s ability to “initiate” a 
divorce and her ability to “execute” a divorce. Despite some ambiguous evidence, 
there is a strong normative presumption that women could not “cause” a divorce 
because a husband must deliver a divorce decree—a written one in the Jewish 
tradition and an oral one in the Islamic tradition.17 As will become evident, these 
two procedural moves—initiating and executing divorce—were likely more 
ambiguous (at least in late antiquity) than commonly assumed. A wife’s ability to 
initiate divorce has legal effect only where a husband’s divorce prerogative is 
circumscribed—either by a court or by the wife herself. Moreover, while family 
members were often involved in a Jewish or Muslim woman’s marriage, women 
were frequently independent actors during divorce.18 In describing women as 
 
240 (Michael E. Bonine et al. eds., 2012). I would prefer to use the more geographically descriptive 
(and less geopolitically constructed) term Southwest Asia, but the reader may be unfamiliar with this 
term. As I use “Near East” here, I primarily refer to Mesopotamia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, 
and Egypt. I recognize that “Near East” is not a fixed region and that the geographic references in 
this Article are fluid, rather than systematic. 
14. A preliminary version of this section was presented as an invited presentation at “Cross 
Currents: Jewish and Islamic Cultural Exchange, 600–1250 CE,” a symposium organized by the Joint 
Doctoral Program in Jewish Studies at the Graduate Theological Union and University of California, 
Berkeley (Oct. 14, 2010). 
15.  I will not discuss any of the rabbinic limitations placed on a husband’s ability to divorce 
because it is beyond the scope of my analysis. But see Mishnah, Gīṭṭīn 9:10 (recounting debate between 
Shammai and Hillel about a husband’s legitimate grounds for divorcing his wifeadultery or any 
reason); see also Babylonian Talmud, Gīṭṭīn 90a. Generally, Islamic law does not restrict a husband’s 
ability to divorce his wife, except by limiting the number of times a husband can divorce the same 
wife after remarriage. 
16. A social history approach of investigating actual divorce processes cannot be sufficiently 
reconstructed using the available historical evidence. 
17. See the discussion in Avishalom Westreich, History, Dogmatics and Hermeneutics: The Divorce 
Clause in Palestinian Ketubbot and the Geonic Compulsion of Divorce 2 (Agunah Research Unit, Working 
Paper No. 15, 2009). 
18. Goitein notes, “At a divorce the wife normally acted on her own. As customary as it was 
that the betrothal be enacted in the absence of the bride, the divorce, by contrast, required her 
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autonomous legal actors, this Article does not project modern notions of women’s 
agency. 
II. A JUDAIC CHRONOLOGY OF WIFE-INITIATED DIVORCE19 
A. Rabbinic Era (70–620 CE) 
There is a thorny scholarly debate surrounding the evidence for Jewish 
women obtaining divorces or actually divorcing their spouses in antiquity and late 
antiquity.20 Without delving into the details, it is evident that the diverse and 
varied situations of pre- and non-rabbinic Jewish women included wife-initiated 
divorce.21 The key documentary evidence is Aramaic marriage contracts of the 
Elephantine Jewish community dated to the fifth century BCE, which include a 
stipulation that a wife may initiate divorce and pay her husband a divorce 
settlement (i.e., not collect her dower).22 At least some Jewish women were able to 
divorce their husbands in the antique and late antique periods. 
 
presence.” 3 S.D. GOITEIN, A MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY: THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF THE 
ARAB WORLD AS PORTRAYED IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CAIRO GENIZA 270 (1978). Muslim 
women also frequently represented themselves in divorce, as will be discussed below in the Islamic 
chronology of wife-initiated divorce. 
19. The periodization of Jewish legal history and dates of rabbinic texts used in this section 
are modified versions of the dates used in contemporary Jewish studies. See THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO THE TALMUD AND RABBINIC LITERATURE, at xiii–xvi (Charlotte Elisheva 
Fonrobert & Martin S. Jaffee eds., 2007). For a critical analysis of periodization in Jewish legal history, 
see Shlomo Zalman Havlin, On Literary Canonization as a Basis for Periodization in Halakha, in 
RESEARCHES IN TALMUDIC LITERATURE: A CONFERENCE IN HONOUR OF THE EIGHTIETH 
BIRTHDAY OF SHAUL LIEBERMAN 148 (Saul Liberman ed., 1983). Since most Jewish legal sources 
represent rabbinic legal opinions, Qaraite and other sectarian legal practices are not fully represented 
in this chronology; references to documentary sources are provided whenever possible in an effort to 
alleviate this imbalance. 
20. See David Instone Brewer, Jewish Women Divorcing Their Husbands in Early Judaism: The 
Background to Papyrus Ṣeeʾlim 13, 92 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 349 (1999); Bernard S. Jackson, Some 
Reflections on Family Law in the Papyri, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES XIV 141 (Hillel Gamoran 
ed., 2002); see also Robert Brody, Evidence for Divorce by Jewish Women?, 50 J. JEWISH STUD. 230 (1999). 
21. “This right of women to divorce their husbands appears to have become a normal part of 
Egyptian Judaism . . . . This is very different from Palestinian and later rabbinic Judaism where a 
woman could only demand a divorce on . . . specific grounds[.]” Brewer, supra note 20, at 354. Also, 
in Palestine, “Some rich or influential Jewish women divorced their husbands under the Roman law.” 
Id. at 356 (citing evidence from Josephus). But note that Jewish women may not at this time (under 
the Herodians, 37 BCE to 92 CE) have perceived divorcing their husbands as being under Roman 
rather than Jewish law. 
22.  Friedman notes that “[t]his right is embodied in a stipulation written in the marriage 
contracts from the fifth century BCE Jewish community of Elephantine. As we learn from the Geniza 
fragments, such a stipulation was written in the ketubbot of Palestine through the eleventh century. 
Passages that reflect the wife’s rights for a divorce can be identified in the Talmudic literature. And in 
some localities, this usage became accepted legal practice in post-Talmudic times.” 1 MORDECHAI A. 
FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN PALESTINE: A CAIRO GENIZAH STUDY 313 (1980) [hereinafter 1 
FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN PALESTINE]; see also MORDECHAI A. FRIEDMAN, GENIZA 
STUDIES IN JEWISH MARRIAGE LAW 4 (1970). Among the documentary evidence that Friedman 
studied is Babatha’s marriage contract (ca. second century CE). See Mordechai A. Friedman, Babatha’s 
‘Ketubba’: Some Preliminary Observations, 46 ISRAEL EXPLORATION J. 55 (1996). For the papyri, see 
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This evidence of Jewish legal practice contrasts somewhat with the content 
of rabbinic legal texts.23 Rabbinic jurisprudence on divorce is ostensibly built 
around one Biblical verse, Deuteronomy 24:1, which describes a husband 
delivering a divorce document to his wife.24 The verse does not specify if this 
divorce procedure is the only legally valid form of divorce.25 But rabbinic jurists 
elaborated a variety of justifications for divorce. In the Tosefta (compiled 220–350 
CE), the rabbis claim that a couple may not continue their marriage if either is 
afflicted with boils.26 The Mishnah (compiled in the early third century CE) briefly 
considers when a woman can demand divorce because of her husband’s 
impotence, her “uncleanliness,” or her vow not to have sex.27 The Mishnah also 
enumerates how a wife gradually loses her divorce settlement for being 
recalcitrant.28 Other rabbinic literature enumerates a husband’s unreasonable 
behavior or defects that warrant a husband being forced to divorce his wife.29 In 
 
THE DOCUMENTS FROM THE BAR KOKHBA PERIOD IN THE CAVE OF LETTERS: HEBREW, 
ARAMAIC, AND NABATEAN-ARAMAIC PAPYRI 118–141 (Yigael Yadin et al. eds., 2002). Goitein 
concurred with Friedman in 3 GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 264. 
23. Bernard Jackson has observed that “the social institution of marriage, as reflected in the 
narratives, appears to deviate from the legal institution, as reflected in the laws . . . the narratives 
conceive of divorce as being performed by expulsion or desertion while the law assumes that any such 
expulsion (he ‘sends her out of his house’, Deut. 24:1, 3) is preceded by the writing and delivery of a 
sefer keritut.” Bernard S. Jackson, The ‘Institutions’ of Marriage and Divorce in the Hebrew Bible, 56 J. 
SEMITIC STUD. 221, 243 (2011). 
24.  “Suppose a man enters into marriage with a woman, but she does not please him because 
he finds something objectionable about her, and so he writes her a certificate of divorce, puts it in her 
hand, and sends her out of his house[.]” Deuteronomy 24:1 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible,  2010). 
25. For a brief introduction to Jewish divorce laws, see RACHEL BIALE, WOMEN AND 
JEWISH LAW: AN EXPLORATION OF WOMEN’S ISSUES IN HALAKHIC SOURCES 70–101 (1984). For a 
more extensive examination, see SHLOMO RISKIN, A JEWISH WOMAN’S RIGHT TO DIVORCE: A 
HALAKHIC HISTORY AND A SOLUTION FOR THE AGUNAH (2006). Riskin is a major modern 
Orthodox rabbinic figure, and the arguments he presents in his text come from within an orthodox 
perspective. 
26. TOSEFTA, Ketubbot 7:11; see also MISHNAH, Ketubbot 7:9-10 (stating that a husband can be 
compelled to divorce his wife if he has certain blemishes or is repulsive). 
27. MISHNAH, Nedarim 11:12 (describing three types of women who can be divorced, but 
retain their dower). According to this passage, Jewish women used to make three claims (i.e., rape, 
impotent husband, vow of refusal, or inability to engage in intercourse) that warranted divorce and 
the full payment of the ketubbah, but the rabbinic sages changed these practices. In the late antique 
Near East, vows were a common aspect of social discourse, such that a woman’s vow may be 
understood as a pretext for initiating divorce. 
28. “Recalcitrant,” in this Article, is equivalent to the category of moredet in Jewish law or 
nāshiz in Islamic law—both of which concern a wife who is broadly perceived as disobedient to her 
husband. (Both terms are also applied to men, but used more frequently to describe women.) Moredet 
is often translated as “rebellious,” but I prefer to translate it as “recalcitrant.” Moreover, while there is 
significant rabbinic-legal discussion about what acts constitute recalcitrance (typically, either denial of 
sex or refusal to perform household chores), I contend that the wife’s actions are less significant than 
the underlying issue of her desire to divorce her husband. In other words, a recalcitrant wife is 
equivalent to a woman who is seeking a divorce. For a discussion of the moredet, see for example 
MISHNAH, Ketubbot 1:2 (wife loses seven dinarim for every week of her recalcitrance). 
29. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 7:1–5 (discussing various cases in which a husband makes 
unconscionable/unreasonable restrictions that warrant compelling the husband to divorce); see also id. 
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the Palestinian Talmud (compiled 220–425 CE), the rabbis comment that a 
woman’s right to divorce consists of tormenting her husband until he gives her a 
writ of divorce.30 But in the same text, it is suggested that, in accordance with a 
marriage contract stipulation, a husband should divorce his wife and pay half the 
dower (ketubbah) payment if the woman expresses an aversion to her husband.31 
The Palestinian Talmud also includes a reference to a conditional divorce in which 
a husband offers his wife a divorce decree if she pays him a specific sum—most 
likely her dower.32 The Babylonian Talmud (compiled 200–650 CE) specifies that a 
woman is entitled to her dower if her husband is infertile or impotent.33 
Moreover, a woman whose husband refuses to provide her conjugal rights can be 
divorced with the court’s intervention and receive her dower.34 
To summarize, this survey of rabbinic literature indicates the following types 
of divorce were recognized in late antiquity: 
(1) A husband divorces his wife for whatever reason and pays her dower.35 
(2) A rabbinic court compels a husband to divorce his wife36 and pay the 
dower because the husband: 
(a) has physical defects;37 
(b) imposes unreasonable restrictions or makes unreasonable 
demands;38 
(c) is sterile, impotent, or refuses to provide conjugal rights;39 
(d) works in a profession considered disgusting;40 
 
7:8–10 (stating that blemishes of which a wife was unaware warrant divorce); PALESTINIAN TALMUD, 
Ketubbot 7:1–5 (describing husband’s behavior that warrants divorce). See also the corresponding 
discussions in the BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 71a–71b, 77a. 
30. PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 5:1. 
31. PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 7:6. A marriage contract stipulation suggesting a wife’s 
ability to initiate divorce is also acknowledged in Palestinian Talmud, Ketubbot 5:9. 
32.  PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Gīṭṭīn 7:5 (stating that if he says, “[T]his is your get if you pay me 
200 zūz,” then she is divorced and pays). Two hundred zūz (silver pieces) is the default dower amount 
for a previously unmarried Jewish woman. This particular divorce negotiation resembles one form of 
khulʿ divorce in Islamic legal practice, which will be discussed below. 
33. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 65a–65b. 
34. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 5:6–7 (stating that a husband’s refusal to provide conjugal rights is 
grounds for adding to a woman’s dower). BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 61b (stating that if a 
husband refuses to provide his wife’s conjugal rights for longer than specified periods, he must 
divorce her and pay her dower). 
35.  See supra text accompanying note 15. The House of Shammai’s argument to limit a 
husband’s ability to divorce was refuted by the House of Hillel. See MISHNAH, Gīṭṭīn 9:10. But the 
ketubbah payment was perceived as an impediment to the husband’s otherwise unencumbered right to 
divorce. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 11a and Yebamot 89a. 
36. MISHNAH, Gīṭṭīn 9:8; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gīṭṭīn 88b (explaining that a Jewish 
court may compel a divorce, but a non-Jewish court may only do so based on the decision of a Jewish 
court; specific type of divorce decree, מעושה גט ); MISHNAH, Arakhin 5:6 (stating a husband is 
compelled to give a writ of divorce to his wife until he says he wills it). 
37. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 7:9. 
38. Id. at 7:1–5. 
39. Id. at 5:6; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 91a. 
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(e) or because the wife has made a vow prohibiting her husband from 
touching her.41 
(3) A husband divorces his wife and does not pay the dower because the 
court has declared the wife to be recalcitrant (i.e., a moredet or in breach 
of contract),42 or because the wife 
(a) apostatized, ignored a Jewish precept, or acted immorally;43 
(b) refused sexual relations with her husband or performance of “wifely 
duties”;44 
(c) or has blemishes or physical defects that impinge the marital 
relationship.45 
The practical consequences of these rabbinic ideas on divorce likely varied 
from community to community.46 Since the Palestinian tradition included a wife’s 
right to divorce in the marriage contract, there may have been distinctions 
between Palestinian and Babylonian divorce practices.47 Moreover, the rabbinic 
prerogative of annulling a marriage may have, in practice, been a means of 
granting a woman a divorce (without the husband’s deliverance of a divorce 
decree).48 Still, this brief schema delineates the basic ideas circulating about 
divorce within late antique rabbinic legal communities. 
B. Geonic Era (620–1050 CE)49 
In 650/651 CE, Geonic rabbis issued a decree (taqqanah) that a recalcitrant 
wife (moredet) could procure a divorce immediately and not lose her dower 
(ketubbah).50 This decree abandoned the twelve-month waiting period and loss of 
 
40. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 7:10. 
41. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
42. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 5:5–7 (defining a recalcitrant wife); PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 
5:8 (stating that a “writ of rebellion” is a charge against or a deduction of the wife’s ketubbah 
payment). BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 63a (stating that the ketubbah of a recalcitrant wife is 
reduced to depletion and she is divorced). 
43. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 7:6. 
44. Id. at 5:7. 
45. Id. at 7:8. 
46. For a broad overview, see HISTORY OF JEWISH WOMEN IN LATE ANTIQUITY (Tal Ilan 
ed., 1994). 
47. 1 FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 313; see also Westreich, 
supra note 17, at 18–21. 
48. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 3a and Gīṭṭīn 33a (explaining that rabbis can annul 
betrothal by returning the dower money or by declaring the sexual act as non-marital, which 
corresponds to the two means of enacting a marriage); see Avishalom Westreich, Umdena as a Ground 
for Marriage Annulment: Between Mistaken Transaction (Kiddushei ta’ut) and Terminative Condition, 20 
JEWISH L. ASS’N STUD. 330 (2010). 
49. On Geonim, see ROBERT BRODY, THE GEONIM OF BABYLONIA AND THE SHAPING OF 
MEDIEVAL JEWISH CULTURE (1998). 
50. This is documented in the Geonic responsa of Rav Sherira Gaon (d. 1038, Babylon): 
Originally, the legal requirement was that we do not coerce the husband to divorce his wife 
if she requests a divorce, except in those [cases] in which the Rabbis stated that they do 
coerce him to divorce her . . . . Later, they made another decree that they would make an 
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dower stipulated for a recalcitrant wife in the Babylonian Talmud.51 Historical 
sources indicate that this decree was viewed by the majority of Geonim as a legal 
enactment validated by judicial authority and social need.52 Genizah evidence53 
indicates that in the medieval Near East, Jewish women could initiate divorce by 
 
announcement concerning her for four consecutive weeks . . . . Finally, they decreed that 
they announce about her for four weeks and she would forfeit everything. Nevertheless, 
they did not coerce the husband to write her a divorce document . . . . And they decreed 
that they make her wait for a divorce for 12 months (from the time she asks for a divorce) 
because they might reconcile and if they do not reconcile after 12 months, they coerce the 
husband and he writes a divorce document for her. After our Sabboraic rabbis, when our 
sages noticed that the daughters of Israel were going and relying upon Gentiles to acquire 
for them divorce documents by force from their husbands and there would be those who 
write divorce documents by coercion and it would be doubtful whether it was a legal or 
illegal divorce and this would lead to calamity . . . . They decreed in the time of Mar Rav 
Rabba son of Rav Hunai (may they rest in Eden) about a recalcitrant wife who requests a 
divorce, that all of the nikhsei tzon barzel (dowry) that she brought with her [into the 
marriage] he must pay for and that even what was destroyed or lost he must pay her . . . 
And they coerce him and he writes for her a divorce document immediately and and she 
receives one or two hundred [the standard dower]. By this custom we practice today as we 
have for three hundred years and more. So should you do as well. 
BENJAMIN MENASSEH LEWIN, OTSAR HA-GE’ONIM: TESHUVOT GE’ONE BAVEL U-FERUSHEHEM 
‘AL PI SEDER HA-TALMUD 8:99–102 (1928). Also cited in RISKIN, supra note 25, at 56–59. Rav 
Sherira Gaon also mentions this decree in THE IGGERES OF RAV SHERIRA GAON 126 (Nosson 
Dovid Rabinowich trans., 1988). See also BRODY, supra note 49, at 62–63; GIDEON LIBSON, JEWISH 
AND ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CUSTOM DURING THE GEONIC PERIOD 111 (2003) 
While I translate taqqanah as decree in this paper, it is to avoid confusing the reader. The literal 
meaning of taqqanah is to straighten and it has the connotation of establishing, instituting, or 
ordaining a legal rule. 
51. In this Article, I assume that by 650 CE, either the Babylonian Talmud had been redacted 
or much of the material in it was associated with a corpus that would later be identified as the 
Babylonian Talmud. “In the case where a woman ‘rebels’ against her husband, her ketubbah (dower) 
may be reduced by seven denarii a week. R. Judah said: seven tropaics. Our Masters went back and 
deliberated that an announcement regarding her shall be made on four consecutive Sabbaths and that 
then the court shall send her [the following warning]: ‘Be it known to you that even if your ketubbah 
is for a hundred maneh you have forfeited it.’” BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 63b. “We also make 
her wait twelve months, a [full] year for her divorce, and during these twelve months she receives no 
maintenance from her husband.” Id. at 64a. The relevant passage features the story of a woman being 
forced to remain married to her husband and implies that it is unwarranted to do so. But note that 
Westreich identifies the twelve-month waiting period as a late Talmudic stratum. Avishalom 
Westreich, Compelling a Divorce? Early Talmudic Roots of Coercion in a Case of Moredet 12 (Agunah Research 
Unit, Working Paper No. 9, 2008). 
52. A Gaon notes, “And now in the two yeshivas they rule on the recalcitrant wife that even 
though she seized something from her ketubbah, we take it from her and we give it to the husband and 
we give her a divorce document immediately.” SIMEON QAYYARA (9th century; Iraq), HALAKHOT 
GEDOLOT § 36, Laws of Marriage. But see infra text accompanying note 59. 
53.  Genizah marriage contracts include explicit stipulations that a wife may relinquish her 
dower and be divorced “by the authorization of the court.” 2 MORDECHAI A. FRIEDMAN, JEWISH 
MARRIAGE IN PALESTINE: A CAIRO GENIZAH STUDY 56 (1980). (For an example of Genizah 
evidence, see the Taylor-Schechter Cairo Genizah Collection at Cambridge University Library TS 13 J 
3, fol. 22, copied from S.D. Goitein’s Typed Texts. 07-09-90, N.H. (p).) Document of a full-fledged 
barāaʾ (release of spouse from obligations upon divorce) in which husband and wife from al-Mahalla 
appear before the court of Fustat, Ab 4973/Ab 1524/August 1213. On Genizah sources generally, 
see Marina Rustow, The Genizah and Jewish Communal History, in FROM A SACRED SOURCE: GENIZAH 
STUDIES IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR STEFAN C. REIF 289 (Ben M. Outhwaite & Siam Bhayro eds., 
2011). 
           
2014] EVERY LAW TELLS A STORY 29 
forfeiting some of their rights—what is often described as a “ransom” divorce, in 
line with the equivalent Arabic terminology.54 This historical evidence should be 
emphasized: the Geonic practice of coercing a husband to divorce a “recalcitrant” 
wife was normative for centuries until its gradual undermining in the late medieval 
period. In other words, when compared to the Rabbinic period (or, more 
precisely, rabbinic texts), an additional option may have been introduced in which 
a woman could obtain a divorce decree immediately (instead of waiting twelve 
months) in exchange for relinquishing part (or all) of her economic rights. This 
differs from the contract stipulation described in the Palestinian Talmud55 because 
an explicit marriage contract stipulation does not appear to have been required 
and because women appear to have been able to initiate divorce proceedings as a 
result of the Geonic decree.56 This form of wife-initiated divorce appears to have 
been implemented by the Geonim as an extension of the Talmudic category of a 
recalcitrant wife.57 In his Halakhot Pesuqot, Rav Yehudai Ben Nah ̣man (d. late 
 
54. See in particular the Judeo-Arabic documents cited in Mordechai A. Friedman, Divorce 
Upon the Wife’s Demand as Reflected in Manuscripts From the Cairo Geniza, 4 JEWISH L. ANN. 103 (1981). 
I concur with Friedman, who notes that “[a] more likely Jewish source for the ransom-divorce may be 
seen in that practice usually referred to as the Gaonic enactment concerning the moredet, the 
recalcitrant wife. According to most traditions, this usage, instituted in Babylonia in 650–651 BC, 
empowered a wife who could not bear living with her husband to initiate divorce proceedings.” 
Mordechai A. Friedman, The Ransom-Divorce: Divorce Proceedings Initiated by the Wife in Medieval Jewish 
Practice, 6 ISR. ORIENTAL STUD. 288, 301 (1976) [hereinafter Friedman, The Ransom-Divorce]. Friedman 
further contends, “The iftidā’ was clearly undertaken by the wife on her own initiative, as a result of 
her unhappiness in the marriage. The wife had renounced her claims against her husband on 
condition that he divorce her.” Id. at 296. Goitein concurred with Friedman and explained that the 
Arabic term for release (barā aʾ) sometimes referred to the divorce decree. 3 GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 
267–68. 
55. PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 5:1, supra note 30. 
56. As will become clear, I challenge the view that this geonic practice “deviated” from 
Talmudic practice and argue that it should be understood as a customary practice, rather than an 
“innovative” enactment. Libson suggests that this Geonic taqqanah might have been a custom. See 
Gideon Libson, Halakhah and Reality in the Gaonic Period: Taqqanah, Minhag, Tradition and Consensus: Some 
Observations, in THE JEWS OF MEDIEVAL ISLAM: COMMUNITY, SOCIETY, AND IDENTITY 67, 72–74, 
84–86 (Daniel Frank ed., 1995). However, Libson also claims: 
There is ample evidence, for example, of women in the category known as ‘rebellious wife’ 
(ishah moredet) appealing to Muslim courts in order to circumvent Jewish law, which would 
not readily grant them a divorce; in such cases the geonim felt it necessary to deviate from 
talmudic law, in order to keep such women in the frame of Jewish courts . . . . Thus, the 
geonim created a takkanah (enactment) that a ‘rebellious wife’ could obtain a divorce 
immediately, rather than wait the extensive time required by rabbinic law, without 
forfeiting the statutory value of her ketubbah (marriage contract). 
GIDEON LIBSON, JEWISH AND ISLAMIC LAW, A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 265, § 11 (2007); see also 2 
MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 658–65 (Bernard Auerbach & 
Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994) (discussing the Geonic decree on the recalcitrant wife); RISKIN, supra 
note 25, at 56. 
57. Friedman explains that “[a]s far as the Geonim were concerned the fact that a wife could 
demand a divorce from her husband was not a new element introduced by the enactment.” 1 
FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRAGE IN PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 324. Elsewhere, Friedman clarifies: 
It would seem most likely that the practice which is referred to in our sources as iftidā’ and 
by Saadiah as xulʿ (ixtilāʿ) was nothing but the then accepted procedure for the recalcitrant 
wife, familiar to us from the Gaonic responsa. The wife’s power to initiate divorce 
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eighth century, Iraq) notes that only a rabbinic court’s coercion of a husband is a 
valid means of compelling a husband to divorce his wife.58 Rabbi Isaac Alfasi (d. 
1103 CE, Maghreb), in his S ̣efer ha-halkhot, written while he was living in Morocco, 
accepts the Geonic practice (of coercing a husband to divorce a recalcitrant wife), 
but suggests that it is not based on talmudic practice.59 Rabbi H ̣ananel ben 
Ḥushiel (d. 1053 CE, Tunisia), however, appears to have understood the Geonic 
decree as permitting a court order that the husband pay the dower, but not that he 
deliver a divorce document.60 
To summarize, Geonic divorce practices included: 
(1) A husband divorces his wife for whatever reason and pays her dower.61 
(2) A rabbinic court compels a husband to divorce his wife and pay the 
dower because the husband:62 
(a) has physical defects; 
(b) imposes unreasonable restrictions or behavior; 
(c) is sterile or impotent; 
(d) or works in a profession considered disgusting. 
(3) A husband divorces his wife and does not pay the dower because the 
court has declared the wife to be recalcitrant (i.e., a moredet or in breach 
of contract) or because the wife: 
(a) apostatized, ignored a Jewish precept, or acted immorally; 
(b) refused sexual relations with her husband or performance of “wifely 
duties”; 
 
proceedings was thus recognized as standard procedure; and it was not necessary to write a 
special stipulation in the marriage contract, as was the Palestinian practice. 
Friedman, The Ransom-Divorce, supra note 54, at 302. 
58. He is known as Yehudai Gaon. YEHUDAI BEN NAHMAN (D. LATE 8TH CENTURY; IRAQ), 
SEFER HALAKHOT PESUKOT 342 (Solomon David Sassoon & Neil Danzig eds., 1998) (explaining 
that it is valid for a non-rabbinic court to coerce a Jewish husband to divorce his wife if a rabbinic 
court authorizes the coercion). 
59. Rabbi Isaac Alfasi is known as the Rif. Westreich notes that 
R. Isaac Alfasi, active in the second half of the eleventh century, was the most prominent 
halakhist in Spain after the geonic period. In his treatise, Ṣefer Ha-Halakhot, widespread 
throughout Spain (where he took refuge late in his life), he explicitly states that the ruling 
coercing the husband to divorce his rebellious wife originates in the geonic ordinance 
rather than in the Talmud itself. 
Westreich, supra note 3, at 209–10. According to Friedman, “[a]lthough a number of the Gaonic responsa 
specify that the husband is compelled to issue a divorce some medieval authorities who based themselves 
exclusively on Alfasi interpreted the Gaonic enactment as if the husband’s consent were required.” 1 
FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 324. 
60. Michael S. Berger, Maimonides on Sex and Marriage, in MARRIAGE, SEX, AND FAMILY IN 
JUDAISM 149, 155–56 (Michael J. Broyde & Michael Ausubel eds., 2005). 
61. But note that Rabbeinu Gershom (d. 1028 CE, Germany) “enacted a decree which made it 
impossible for a husband to divorce his wife against her will.” RISKIN, supra note 25, at xii. 
62. These grounds for compelling a husband to divorce his wife are discussed in Geonic 
responsa. See, e.g., ALBERT HARKAVY, TESHUVOT HA-GEONIM: SHEELOT U-TESHUVOT § 451 
(Menorah, Makhon Le-Mehkar Ule-Hotsaat Kitve-Yad U-Sefarim ‘Atikim 1959) (1887). 
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(c) or has blemishes or physical defects that impinge the marital 
relationship. 
(4) A wife divorces her husband, receiving either her full dower or part of it 
and without waiting twelve months. In practice, it is unclear if the wife 
actually received the dower or relinquished it.63 
The final category was explicitly practiced in the Geonic period, but it is 
unclear precisely who (husband or court) delivered the divorce decree.64 Since 
there is limited surviving historical evidence, we cannot be certain which divorce 
types were most prevalent. 
C. Era of the Rishonim (1050–1400 CE) 
In the post-Geonic era, the Rishonim (roughly, medieval rabbis) further 
elaborated rabbinic opinions on when a woman could be divorced from her 
husband.65 Two subcategories in this period appear to have supplemented the 
rabbinic “short list” of grounds that warrant a court ordering a husband to divorce 
his wife: (1) the husband’s adultery66 and (2) the husband’s transgression of the 
laws of Moses (or apostasy).67 A woman’s ability to initiate a divorce without 
citing one of the grounds specified in the Babylonian Talmud became, during the 
period of the Rishonim, an issue debated by jurists that generated a variety of 
regional practices.68 
Generally, the Rishonim debated a rabbinic court’s ability to coerce a 
husband to divorce his recalcitrant wife by making conflicting assertions about the 
so-called “origin” of the law: the Talmud or the Geonic decree. Rashi (d. 1105 CE, 
France) suggested that the Talmud was the source of the practice.69 His grandson 
 
63. Goitein notes that the Genizah contains numerous documents indicating that Jewish 
wives initiated divorce proceedings by renouncing their financial claims (i.e., their dowers) against 
their husbands. 3 GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 265. 
64. As in the case of evidence of Jewish women divorcing in antiquity, the interpretation of 
the historical record is obfuscated by an “orthodox” presumption that only husbandsnot rabbinic 
courtscan deliver the divorce decree. But the evidence of substantive flexibility (i.e., Jewish wives 
initiating divorces) insinuates some procedural flexibility (i.e., less formalism than the presumption 
that only husbands may deliver divorce decrees). Moreover, Qaraites permitted judicial divorce 
decrees. See infra text accompanying note 160. In addition, it is unclear if Islamic courts only coerced 
Jewish husbands to deliver divorce decrees or if they also provided judicial divorce decrees. Goitein 
mentions Genizah evidence of a Jewish woman who went to a Muslim judge to divorce her husband 
against his will; the judge may have issued the divorce decree. 3 GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 265. 
65.  Elaboration of Talmudic discussions include: (a) refusal or inability to provide wife 
sufficient maintenance, JOSEPH BEN EPHRAIM KARO (D. 1575; SPAIN), SHŪLHAN ʿARŪKH, Even 
Haʿezer, Ketubbot 70:3 (1563); (b) refusal of conjugal rights, id. at Even Haʿezer, Ketubbot 76:11; (c) 
husband’s inability to provide maintenance or sex, id. at Even Haʿezer, Gīṭṭīn 154:3; (d) husband is 
compelled to divorce his wife if he engages in a disgusting profession, id. at Even Haʿezer, Gīṭṭīn 154:1.  
66. Id. 
67. See also KARO, SHŪLHAN ʿARŪKH, Even Haʿezer, Gīṭṭīn 154:1. 
68. For a thorough discussion of the medieval debates on the recalcitrant wife doctrine, see 
Westeich, supra note 3. 
69. Rashi (d. 1105; France) offers the following gloss of Ketubbot 63b: “One who says ‘I want 
him’we should force her by reducing her ketubbah. But if she said ‘he is repulsive to me’I do not want 
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(Rashbam, d. 1158 CE, France) upheld the decree by ruling that a husband should 
be coerced to divorce his recalcitrant wife.70 However, Rashbam’s brother, 
Rabbeinu Tam (d. 1171 CE, France) rejected the Geonic decree of coercing the 
husband to divorce his wife and effectively claimed that the Geonic practice was 
unorthodox.71 
In comparison, Maimonides (d. 1204 CE, Andalusia/Egypt) criticized, but 
did not entirely reject, Geonic practices pertaining to a wife’s ability to demand a 
divorce as a recalcitrant wife (moredet).72 Viewing the Geonic decree as based on 
Talmudic practice, Maimonides differentiated between two types of recalcitrant 
wives: (a) one who “loathes” her husband must forfeit her dower in order for the 
husband to “be compelled to divorce her immediately”73 and (b) one who “rebels 
against her husband merely in order to torment him” becomes the subject of a 
daily public announcement threatening the forfeiture of her dower if she persists 
in her recalcitrance;74 if she persists, then she is prohibited from receiving 
maintenance (i.e., alimony) for twelve months, when she finally receives her 
 
either him or his ketubbah. No pressure is placed on her  to delay her, but rather he gives her a divorce 
document and she is divorced without a ketubbah.” Id. at 212 (citing RASHI, Ketubbot 63b). 
70. Id. at 212 (citing RASHBAM IN TUR, Even Haʿezer, ch. 77). 
71. In ṢEFER HA-YASHAR, Responsa § 24, Rabbeinu Tam (d. 1171; France) explains: 
The Geonim decreed that we do not delay her 12 months for a divorce document, but 
rather we coerce him (to give it). Heaven forbid that our rabbis should increase the 
mamzerim (bastards) in Israel, for we established that Ravina and Rav Ashi were the end 
of the “instruction.” And granted that the Geonim were able to establish that the ketubbah 
of a woman could be collected on movable property [whereas in Talmudic times it was 
only collectable on immovable property], based on halakhah or their own opinion, that is a 
monetary issue. But to permit an invalid divorce document, we do not have the authority 
from the days of Rav Ashi to the days of the messiah. 
RISKIN, supra note 25, at 98–99. See also Westreich, supra note 3, at 212 (citing Ṣefer ha-yashar, 
RESPONSA § 24 and TOSAFOT, Ketubbot 63b). Riskin offers a theory about Rabbeinu Tam’s influence:  
 Insisting that there was no Talmudic precedent for coercing a husband to divorce his wife 
on the basis of her subjective claim that he was repulsive to her, he rejected the earlier 
Gaonic decrees. So overwhelming was his personality, and so cogent his legal reasoning, 
that his ruling influenced all subsequent halakhic authorities. From his time onward, the 
tide turned in the other direction, and the position of earlier authorities such as Alfasi and 
Maimonides was rejected. To this day the law is such that a woman who finds her husband 
distasteful has no legal recourse and must remain tied to a husband she abhors.  
RISKIN, supra note 25, at xiii; see also 2 ELON, supra note 56, at 661–62 (explaining that Rabbeinu Tam 
invalidated the authority of Geonim to enact divorce legislation); Westreich, supra note 3, at 212 
(discussing Rabbeinu Tam’s influence). 
72. In Hilkhot Ishut 14:14, Maimonides claims, “The Gaonim reported that in Babylonia they 
have different customs pertaining to the recalcitrant wife, but those customs did not spread to the 
majority of Israel and many great scholars in many places disagree with them. We ought to recognize 
and to rule according to Talmudic law.” MAIMONIDES (D. 1204; ANDALUSIA/EGYPT), MISHNEH 
TORAH Hilkhot Ishut 14:14, at 90. 
73. In Hilkhot Ishut 14:8, Maimonides explicitly states that a woman is not held captive and 
forced to have sex with her husband if she despises him. Id. Hilkhot Ishut 14:8, at 88–89. 
74. Shai Secunda has pointed out to me that this practice of making a public announcement is 
evident in Zoroastrian law, discussed in the Babylonian Talmud, and mentioned in the Palestinian 
Talmud in reference to a Babylonian sage. Therefore, these public announcements were likely a 
Babylonian practice shared by many groups in that region. 
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divorce decree.75 A practical application of his legal opinions is evident in a 
Maimonidean responsum, which makes clear that a woman who chooses to 
divorce leaves without her dower and the husband is forced to divorce her.76 
The debate among Rishonim about the legitimacy of the Geonic decree was 
fundamentally related to broader questions of juristic authority.77 Rashba (d. 1310 
CE, France) accepted Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion that the Geonic practice was not 
based on the Talmud, but did not describe it as legally invalid.78 Rabbeinu Asher 
(d. 1327 CE, Germany/Toledo) opposed the Geonic decree on the grounds that it 
was not accepted by a majority of Jews and that social circumstances had changed 
since its enactment.79 By the early fourteenth century, a perspective of the Western 
Rishonim that the Geonic decree was invalid began  to dominate. By the sixteenth 
century, a major Jewish law code acknowledged a rabbinic court’s ability to 
 
75. MAIMONIDES, supra note 72, Hilkhot Ishut 14:9-13, at 89–90. 
76. Responsum 34. A translation and discussion of this responsum is available in Reneé 
Levine Melammed, He Said, She Said: A Woman Teacher in Twelfth-Century Cairo, 22 ASS’N FOR JEWISH 
STUD. REV. 19, 27 (1997). 
77. This is evident in many rabbinic texts and appears explicitly in Rabbi Yitzhak Ben Moshe. 
See YITZHAK BEN MOSHE (d. 1250; Vienna), ṢEFER OR ZARUʿA, § 1, responsa 4354: 
The Geonim of the yeshivas of Babylonia, our Savoraic rabbis who were after the 
‘instruction,’ decreed that they coerce a husband to give a divorce document to a 
recalcitrant wife immediately and also the Baʿal of Halakhot Gedolot wrote and also Rav 
Hai and Rav Sherira wrote and all the Geonim, that for more than 300 years from their 
days this decree was decreed and there is no deviation from this. And thus also Rav Alfasi 
wrote his legal opinion and there is no one who can uproot the decree of the great bet din 
of Babylonia. Therefore, this divorce document is legitimate and there is no questioning it. 
And, moreoever, she has a strong claim that he cannot have sex with her and since he 
agreed to give her a divorce document even though by coercion, then his divorce is valid. 
For we have here a commandment to obey the words of the sages, the decree of the great 
bet din . . . . 
78. In RESPONSA, part 2, section 276, Rashba (d. 1310, Spain) states, “Nevertheless, if it is 
their custom in those places to do as Maimonides, let them. Because even Geonim, you know they 
said: we coerce (him) to divorce (her) as long as she is recalcitrant. And in the places where they 
follow that tradition, we have no authority to disagree with them or to void their words.” See also 
Westreich, supra note 3, at 213–14. Rashba claims that “[i]t is now fitting to be very cautious about 
this issue, and not to act in accordance with this [Geonic] decree at all, for it has already been nullified 
because of the generation.” RISKIN, supra note 25, at 119. 
79. Rabbeinu Asher is known as the Rosh. RISKIN, supra note 25, at 126–27 (citing the Rosh’s 
claims that the Geonic decree was for a particular generation and that Rabbeinu Gershom represented 
uninterruped rabbinic tradition); see also 2 ELON, supra note 56, at 662–65. The Rosh’s son, Jacob ben 
Asher (d. ca. 1349; Spain; also known as the T ̣ur), is the author of an important code of Jewish law. In 
Even Haʿezer, marriage laws, section 77, the T ̣ur notes: 
The woman who refuses her husband sex there are many decrees enacted on the 
subject . . . . We saw a Geonic (text) that states to give her (the recalcitrant wife) her 
essential ketubbah of 100 or 200 so that the daughters of Israel do not become illicit (i.e., 
engage in immoral sexual behavior) . . . . The Rosh, according to the words of Rav Alfasi, 
said that when they saw the denigration among the daughters of Israel and that if they 
waited 12 months for a divorce document they would rely upon idol-worshippers and go 
out to evil culture . . . . The sages of Ashkenaz and Sefard agreed that in the case of ‘he is 
repulsive to me’ it is not permissible to coerce the husband to divorce so every judge 
should be careful not to coerce a divorce in the case of ‘he is repulsive to me.’ And also 
they do not coerce her to be with him . . . . 
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compel a divorce, but in situations of the husband’s unwillingness to support his 
wife.80 
It may be possible to differentiate the legal practices of the “East” (including 
Babylonia and North Africa) from the legal practices of the “West” (including 
primarily Europe). Jewish communities in the East continued to coerce husbands 
to divorce their wives, as documented by Genizah evidence.81 The perspective of 
Western rabbinic authorities appears to have arrived in the East at the end of the 
fourteenth century when two rabbinic jurists (Ribash and Rashbatz) moved from 
the southern regions of modern-day Spain to North Africa and prohibited 
coercion of a husband to divorce a recalcitrant wife.82 
This condensed chronology of Jewish women’s access to divorce indicates 
that a prevalent Eastern practice of rabbinic courts coercing husbands to divorce 
“recalcitrant” wives was gradually abolished by Western Rishonim (late medieval 
rabbis) as a result of its characterization as unorthodox.83 Rather than resolve the 
debate about the orthodoxy (or lack thereof) of the Geonic decree, I want to turn 
to the Islamic chronology, which may elucidate some of the confusion in the 
authority issues of the Judaic chronology. 
III. AN ISLAMIC CHRONOLOGY OF WIFE-INITIATED DIVORCE84 
A. Legal Circles (610–750 CE) 
Muslim women’s divorce options in the earliest decades of Islamic history 
cannot be easily reconstructed, but some historical texts can illuminate the orally 
transmitted traditions of the late antique period.85 Most of the Qurʾānic verses 
dealing with the subject of divorce are addressed to men and discuss the post-
 
80. KARO (D. 1575; SPAIN), SHŪLHAN ʿARŪKH, Even Haʿezer, Gīṭṭīn 154:3. 
81. See the Taylor-Schechter Cairo Genizah Collection at Cambridge University Library, 
Additional Series 146 4 (requiring by court order a husband to write a divorce decree for his wife in 
Egypt, ca. 1240); id. at New Series J 455 (forcing a husband to give his wife a divorce decree). 
82. Ribash is Rabbi Isaac Bar Sheshet (d. 1408, Spain/Algiers) and Rashbatzh (also Tashbatz) 
is Simeon ben Zemah Duran (d. 1444, Spain/Algiers). Westreich, supra note 3, at 216–17. 
83. How to interpret the historical evidence of Jewish women initiating divorces is the crucial 
issue here. Friedman summarized that “during a millennium and a half it was stipulated in ketubbot 
and rabbis eventually recognized as binding that through the wife’s initiative, if she found life with her 
husband unbearable, the court would take action to terminate the marriage.” Friedman, supra note 22, 
at 27. 
84. The periodization used in this section is my own and is not standard in the field of Islamic 
legal studies. I elaborate this periodization in Lena Salaymeh, Islamic Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (James D. Wright ed., forthcoming 2015). 
85. Two of the earliest surviving compilations of reports (mus ̣annafāt) are of al-S ̣anʿānī (d. 
827) and Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849). In this section, I will focus on these sources for historical 
information about the mid-seventh to mid-eighth centuries because these texts are less entangled in 
particular juristic outcomes than other collections. See ʿABD AL-MAJĪD MAHMŪD ʿABD AL-MAJĪD, 
AL-ITTIJĀHĀT AL-FIQHĪYAH ʿINDA ẠSHĀB AL-HADĪTH FĪ AL-QARN AL-THĀLITH AL-HIJRĪ 
(Maktabat al-Khānjī 1979). On the reliability of these sources, see HARALD MOTZKI, HADĪTH: 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS (2004). 
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divorce waiting period and alimony.86 But one key verse declares: “if you fear that 
they (the couple) cannot maintain God’s limits, then it will not be held against 
them (the couple) if she (the wife) forfeits something.”87 Major exegetical texts 
and other historical sources interpret this verse as relating to an actual incident in 
which the Prophet approved a woman returning her dower (mahr) to effect a 
divorce.88 In all versions of this narrative, the wife returns the entire dower she 
had received from her husband and the Prophet approves her action. Most late 
antique Muslim traditionists interpreted the narrative as limiting the amount a 
woman forfeits to the amount she received as dower, since there are no Prophetic 
reports permitting a husband to take more than the dower.89 But jurists did not 
restrict this form of divorce to judicial intervention.90 Most versions of the 
narrative describe the event without indicating that the woman was at fault, but 
rather that she found her husband intolerable.91 Yet there are other variations of 
this narrative that imply distinct conditions surrounding this particular woman’s 
forfeiture divorce (khulʿ ): she was abused;92 she was recalcitrant;93 or her husband 
consented to the divorce settlement.94 In discussing a woman’s potential fault, 
 
86. Relevant verses include Qurʾān 2:228–32, 2:236–37, 2:241, 65:1–7, 4:35. 
87. Id. at 2:229. The verse is commonly understood as referring to khul .ʿ 
88. This is a narrative about a woman named Habībah who initiates and affects a divorce by 
returning her dower to her husband. 6 ʿABD AL-RAZZA ̄Q IBN HAMMĀM AL-HIMYARĪ AL-SANʿĀNĪ (D. 
827; YEMEN), MUSANNAF FĪ AL-HADĪTH 482–503 (Habīb al-Raḥmān al-ʿẠzamī ed., 1970). The same 
narrative is reported by numerous other traditionists, not cited here, including Mālik (d. 796), Bukhārī 
(d. 870), Muslim (d. 875), Dārimī (d. 869), Ibn Mājah (d. 887), Abū Dāwūd (d. 889), and al-Tirmidhī 
(d. 892). In some versions of the narrative, the woman is identified as Jamīlah and in other versions 
her name is not used. 
89. 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 501–06 (indicating that in the majority of reports a 
husband may not take more than dower in khul  ʿdivorce); 4 ʿABD ALLĀH IBN MUHAMMAD IBN ABĪ 
SHAYBAH (D. 849; IRAQ), AL-KITĀB AL-MUSANNAF FĪ AL-AHĀDĪTH WA-AL-ĀTHĀR 128–29 
(Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salām Shāhīn ed., 1995) (indicating that in the majority of reports a husband 
may not take more than dower in khulʿ divorce). 
90. 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 494–95 (indicating that in the majority of reports, khulʿ is 
permissible without court intervention); 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, MUSANNAF, supra note 89, at 124–25 
(indicating that in the majority of reports khulʿ is permissible without court intervention); 
MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH ʿUTHMĀN IBN ʿAFFĀN 162–63 (Jāmiʿat Umm 
al-Qura ́, Kullīyat Al-Sharīʿah Wa-Al-Dirāsāt Al-Islāmīyah, Markaz Al-Baḥth Al-ʿIlmī Wa-Iḥyāʾ eds., 
1983) [hereinafter QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿUTHMĀN IBN ʿAFFĀN] (suggesting that khulʿ is permissible without a 
judge). But see 1 MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH AL-HASAN AL-BASRĪ 386 (1989) 
[hereinafter QALʿAH’JĪ, AL-HASAN AL-BASRĪ] (suggesting that khulʿ is not permissible without court 
intervention). 
91. 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 483; MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH 
ʿALĪ IBN ABĪ TĀLIB 246 (1983) (asserting that khulʿ is permissible if wife states that she finds husband 
intolerable). 
92. 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 482–84. 
93. Id. at 495–98 (indicating that in the majority of reports, the husband can only accept 
payment from wife if she finds him intolerable or she is recalcitrant); IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 
89, at 120–21 (suggesting that a wife’s recalcitrance is a condition for forfeiture divorce); QALʿAH’JĪ, 
supra note 91, at 246 (explaining that khulʿ is permissible if wife is recalcitrant). Some reports limit the 
forfeiture divorce to a wife who committed a grave sin (such as adultery). 
94. The implication of consent is that this divorce was not unilaterally imposed on the 
husband by the Prophet. AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 502–03. 
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some jurists were concerned with preventing an injustice prohibited in the Qur āʾn: 
a woman relinquishing her dower right without cause in order to divorce her 
husband.95 Late antique jurists ruled that if a husband abuses his wife in order to 
pressure her to pursue a forfeiture divorce, then that divorce is void and the wife 
receives her full dower.96 In addition, there seems to have been some ambiguity as 
to the status of a forfeiture divorce: was it a revocable divorce, an irrevocable 
divorce, or a rescission?97 Most late antique jurists ruled that a forfeiture divorce is 
irrevocable or that it is a rescission.98 
That this wife-initiated divorce was historically practiced is corroborated by a 
report that ʿUmar (d. 644), the second caliph, condemned criticism of women 
who demanded a divorce by forfeiting their dowers.99 (This type of criticism is 
apparent in reports that women who pursue forfeiture divorces are morally 
compromised.100) There were four basic late antique Islamic divorce practices: 
(1) The most frequently discussed situation is of a husband divorcing his 
wife and paying a divorce settlement.101 According to some jurists, he 
could avoid paying the post-divorce alimony if she was deemed 
recalcitrant.102 
(2) A husband offers his wife the option of choosing divorce or staying 
 
95. The Qurāʾnic verse is 4:19 (“[D]o not compel them (women) to give away part of what you 
have given them unless they commit an obvious sin.”). 
96. MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH SUFYĀN AL-THAWRĪ 378 (1990) 
(explaining that khulʿ is void under duress of husband’s abuse and husband must return dower). 
97. There are two basic categories of divorce: (1) ṭalāq raj īʿ is a revocable divorce in which the 
couple can reconcile under the terms of the original marriage contract during a specified waiting 
period; (2) ṭalāq bāʾin is an irrevocable divorce that necessitates a new marriage contract. The sources 
indicate that khul  ʿ was inconsistently described as divorce (conflictingly specified as irrevocable or 
revocable) or faskh (rescission or voiding of the marriage contract). AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 
480–82; 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 113, 121–23 (providing conflicting opinions on the 
revocability of a forfeiture divorce). 
98. QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 91, at 247 (classifying khulʿ as an irrevocable divorce); MUHAMMAD 
RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH ʿUMAR IBN ʿABD AL-ʿAZĪZ 268 (Jāmiʿat Al-Kuwayt ed., 
2001) [hereinafter QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿUMAR IBN ʿABD AL-ʿAZĪZ] (classifying khulʿ as an irrevocable 
divorce); MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿUMAR: ʿASRUHU 
WA-HAYĀTUH 324 (1986) (providing conflicting reports on khulʿ as divorce or recission); QALʿAH’JĪ, 
supra note 96, at 378–79 (classifying khulʿ as irrevocable divorce); MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, 
MAWSŪʿAT FIQH ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABBĀS 313–34 (1996) [hereinafter QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿABD ALLĀH IBN 
ʿABBĀS] (classifying khulʿ as recission); 1 QALʿAH’JĪ, AL-HASAN AL-BASRĪ, supra note 90, at 386–87 
(classifying khul  ʿas irrevocable divorce). 
99. 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 201; 4 ʿABD ALLĀH IBN MUHAMMAD IBN ABĪ 
SHAYBAH, MUSANNAF FĪ AL-AHĀDĪTH WA-AL-ĀTHĀR 185 (Saī̒d Laḥḥām ed., 1989) (condemning 
criticism of women who seek khulʿ divorces); QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿUMAR IBN ʿABD AL-ʿAZĪZ, supra note 98, 
at 268 (claiming that khulʿ divorce is permitted where wife finds her husband intolerable); see also 11 
AHMAD IBN AL-HUSAYN AL-BAYHAQĪ (D. 1066; KHURASAN), AL-SUNAN AL-KUBRA 182 (1996) 
(condemning criticism of women who seek khul  ʿdivorces). 
100. 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 201. 
101. Id. at Kitāb Al-Talāq passim; 6 MUHAMMAD IBN IDRĪS AL-SHĀFIʿĪ (D. 820; 
ARABIA/EGYPT), AL-UMM passim (2001). 
102. QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 96, at 780–81 (stating that a recalcitrant wife does not receive post-
divorce alimony and making no mention of dower reduction or loss). 
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with him; if she chooses divorce, he pays her the full divorce 
settlement.103 
(3) A wife divorces her husband and she pays some form of divorce 
settlement by relinquishing part or all of her dower.104 
(4) A court divorces a couple because the husband is unable to provide his 
wife with sufficient maintenance,105 is missing,106 or is impotent.107 
This historical evidence unambiguously records a wife’s ability to initiate and 
to effect a divorce (khul ʿ) in seventh-century Arabia, but the conditions 
surrounding a wife’s divorce option were imprecise. There seems to have been a 
gendered aspect to the legal terminology used by jurists in this period.108 
B. Professionalization of Legal Schools (800–1050 CE) 
Professional jurists replaced the imprecision surrounding wife-initiated 
divorce with elaborate juridical categories. In comparison to earlier h ̣adīth 
collections (mus ̣annafāt), slightly later, canonical compilations reduce the number of 
 
103. This is based on a Prophetic precedent. YAʿQŪB IBN IBRĀHĪM AL-ANSĀRĪ AL-KŪFĪ ABŪ 
YŪSUF (D. 798; IRAQ), KITĀB AL-ĀTHĀR 139–41 (1978); 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 515–26; 7 
Id. at 8–15; 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 92–94; 1 MUHAMMAD IBN YAZĪD IBN MĀJAH (D. 
887; IRAN), SUNAN AL-MUSTAFÁ 632 (Abī Al-Hasan Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Hādī Al-Sindī Hanafī 
ed., 1975) [hereinafter IBN MĀJAH, SUNAN AL-MUSTAFÁ] (reporting that the Prophet offered his 
wives a divorce option); 1  IBN MĀJAH (D. 887; IRAN), SUNAN ABĪ ʿABD ALLĀH MUHAMMAD IBN 
YAZĪD AL-QAZWĪNĪ IBN MĀJAH 661–62 (MUHAMMAD FUĀʾD ʿABD AL-BĀQĪ ed., 1952–54) 
[hereinafter IBN MĀJAH, SUNAN IBN MĀJAH] (reporting that the Prophet gave wives the option to 
divorce and receive full dower). The following late antique jurists validated giving a wife the option to 
divorce without relinquishing her dower: QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 91, at 440–43; QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿUTHMĀN 
IBN ʿAFFĀN, supra note 90, at 257; QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿUMAR, supra note 98, at 562–64; 
MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH ZAYD IBN THĀBIT WA-ABĪ HURAYRAH 197–98 
(1993); QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 96, at 614–16; QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABBĀS, supra note 98, at 
510. 
104. 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 490–91, 494–95, 500–06; 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra 
note 89, at 120–23, 128–29; QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿUTHMĀN IBN ʿAFFĀN, supra note 90, at 162 (indicating that 
the first four caliphs all permitted khulʿ divorce); see also 7 MUHAMMAD IBN ISMĀʿĪL BUKHĀRĪ (D. 
870; KHURĀSĀN), SAHĪH AL-BUKHĀRĪ [THE TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS OF SAHIH AL-
BUKHĀRĪ, ARABIC-ENGLISH] 149–51 (Muhammad Muhsin Khan trans., 1981); ʿALĪ IBN JAʿFAR 
MADANĪ (D. 825), MASĀIʾL ʿALĪ IBN JAʿFAR WA-MUSTADRAKĀTUHĀ 283 (1990) (Imāmī Shī īʿ: a 
woman relinquishes any monetary claims against the husband in wife-initiated divorce). (There was a 
minority opinion that prohibited forfeiture divorces and another minority opinion that only permitted 
them with judicial intervention; but neither of these positions was normative. ʿABLAH KAHLĀWĪ, AL-
KHUL :ʿ DAWĀ ʾMĀ LĀ DAWĀ ʾLA-HU: DIRĀSAH FIQHĪYAH MUQĀRANAH 68–69 (2000).) 
105. 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 174–75; QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 91, at 456 
(indicating a judge may issue a divorce if the husband is unable or unwilling to provide maintenance). 
But see QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 96, at 781 (indicating a judge does not divorce a couple if the husband is 
unable to provide sufficient maintenance for the wife). 
106. QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABBĀS, supra note 98, at 520 (indicating a judge may issue 
a divorce with sufficient grounds, such as abandonment). 
107. QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 91, at 454–55 (indicating that a divorce is granted if husband is 
impotent or cannot provide the wife with conjugal rights). 
108. QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABBĀS, supra note 98, at 312, 510 (indicating that in khul  ʿ
the wife pays for separation, whereas ṭalāq is husband’s option). 
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reports about wife-initiated divorce (khulʿ ) and limit these divorces to situations 
where a wife has “sufficient” grounds.109 There were conflicting opinions about 
what constituted reasonable justification for a wife to pursue a divorce, with some 
jurists identifying her expressed statement of abhorrence as sufficient.110 Yet most 
Muslim jurists interpreted the narratives about the Prophetic precedent permitting 
wife-initiated divorce111 as including a requirement of the husband’s consent112 or 
as being prompted by a situation of abuse.113 Many legal texts of this period also 
 
109. I compared the muṣannafāt of al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 827) and Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849) to Scott 
Lucas’s schematic study of the texts of Bukhārī (d. 870), Muslim (d. 875), Dārimī (d. 869), Ibn Mājah 
(d. 887), Abū Dāw ūd (d. 889), and al-Tirmidhī (d. 892). The later texts have fewer reports about khulʿ 
and suggest the necessity of “sufficient” grounds (such as spousal abuse or a husband’s consent) that 
were not explicit in earlier texts. Scott C. Lucas, Divorce, Hadīth-Scholar Style: From Al-Dārimī to Al-
Tirmidhī, 19 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 325, 368 (2008). Later sources include more versions implying that it is 
wrong for a woman to demand a divorce without sufficient “justification.” 1 IBN MĀJAH (D. 887; 
IRAN), SUNAN IBN MĀJAH, supra note 103, at 662 (suggesting that a woman who demands a divorce 
without grounds will be punished in the hereafter); see also 2 MUHAMMAD IBN ʿĪSÁ TIRMIDHĪ (D. 892; 
KHURĀSĀN), SUNAN AL-TIRMIDHĪ WA-HUWA AL-JĀMI  ʿ AL-SAHĪH 429–30 (ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ʿAbd 
al-Laṭīf & ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ʿUthmān eds., 1965) (including narratives about the evils of a 
woman demanding a divorce without sufficient justification). 
110. See supra text accompanying note 91. Some canonical Sunnī texts seem to have 
understood a wife’s disgust for her husband as sufficient grounds. See, e.g., 1 IBN MĀJAH, SUNAN IBN 
MĀJAH, supra note 103, at 663 (implying that Ḥabībah pursued khulʿ because her husband was 
repulsive). Note that Imāmī Shī īʿ sources make the wife’s explicit statement of disgust for her 
husband incumbent in a khul  ʿ divorce. 7 MUHAMMAD IBN AL-HASAN HỤRR AL-ʿĀMILĪ (D. 1693; 
LEBANON/IRAN), WASĀIʾL AL-SHĪʿAH ILA TAHSĪL MASĀIʾL AL-SHARĪʿAH 487–89 (Imāmī Shī īʿ) 
(ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Rabbānī, et al. eds., 1956). This resembles the rabbinic discussions of a wife who 
seeks a divorce because her husband is repulsive. See supra text accompanying notes 69, 73, 79. 
111. Supra text accompanying note 88. 
112. Most versions of the narrative suggest that the husband was not consulted, but rather 
that the Prophet simply agreed to the woman’s (Ḥabībah’s) suggestion of giving back the garden she 
had received as her dower and the husband, upon learning of the Prophet’s approval, acquiesced. 
Supra text accompanying note 94. This is a key procedural issue, since a husband’s unilateral 
prerogative to effect the divorce is not substantiated by all versions of this narrative. Specific 
examples include the following: 6 AL-SHĀFIʿĪ, supra note 101, at 500, no. 2503 & no. 2504 (providing 
no mention of spousal abuse or husband’s consent); 3 AHMAD IBN SHUʿAYB NASĀĪʾ (D. 915; 
EGYPT/SYRIA), KITĀB AL-SUNAN AL-KUBRA 369 (ʿAbd al-Ghaffār Sulaymān Bindārī & Sayyid 
Kasrawī Hasan eds., 1991) (giving no indication of abuse or husband’s consent in narrative). Bājī 
includes the narrative about Ḥabībah without stipulating the husband’s consent and includes a 
narrative about a woman who divorced (ikhtalʿat, feminine form of the verb khulʿ ) her husband. 5 
SULAYMĀN IBN KHALAF BĀJĪ (D. 1081; ANDALUSIA), AL-MUNTAQA: SHARH MUWATTA ʾ MĀLIK 
295–300 (Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā ed., 1999). Arabi has also observed that the H ̣abībah 
narrative in the canonical text of al-Bukhārī does not indicate the husband’s permission was necessary 
for wife-initiated divorce. Arabi, supra note 4, at 20. 
113. There are several different versions of this narrative. See supra text accompanying notes 
92–94. The version that includes abuse becomes more dominant in a later period. While Dārimī, Ibn 
Mājah, Abū Dāwūd, and al-Tirmidhī include a category of reports preventing a woman from seeking 
to divorce a non-abusive husband, the other texts (i.e., Bukhārī and Muslim) do not. See Lucas, supra 
note 109, at 368. By way of illustration, Nasāīʾ (d. 915) and Ṭabarānī (d. 971) narrate the Prophetic 
story about the woman divorcing her husband and returning her dower (which is narrated in earlier 
collections), but add that the husband was abusive (which does not appear in earlier collections). 
KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 63; see also 2 ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABD AL-RAHMĀN DĀRIMĪ (D. 869; 
SAMARQAND), SUNAN AL-DĀRIMĪ 162 (Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Khālidī ed., 1996) (claiming that 
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closely associated with wife-initiated divorce (khulʿ ) and recalcitrant wives, which 
was less evident in earlier texts.114 Consequently, the legal possibility that seems to 
prevail in this period is a husband’s option to divorce his wife and not pay the full 
dower if she is considered recalcitrant (nāshizah).115 This juristic elaboration of the 
forfeiture divorce is remarkable because the legal option of husbands paying less 
than the divorce settlement is not substantiated by a Prophetic legal precedent.116 
Instead, it appears to have been elaborated by Muslim jurists in this period. 
Whereas earlier texts included women’s voices, in later texts it is primarily 
men enacting forfeiture divorce.117 Thus, whereas khulʿ  seemed to have simply 
been the term used for wife-initiated divorce in an earlier period, it became a term 
used for divorce situations in which the husband paid less than the full divorce 
settlement.118 This coincided with what appears to be a slight change in the dower 
 
H ̣abībah’s husband was abusive); 1 SULAYMĀN IBN AL-ASHʿATH AL-SIJISTĀNĪ ABŪ DĀWŪD (D. 889; 
IRAQ), SUNAN ABĪ DĀWŪD 462 (Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Hamīd ed., 1970) (providing 
different narratives in which Ḥabībah’s husband was or was not abusive); 4 Id. at 310–11 (providing 
different narratives in which Ḥabībah’s husband was or was not abusive); 2 ABŪ JAʿFAR MUHAMMAD 
IBN JARĪR AL-TABARĪ (D. 923; IRAQ), JĀMI  ʿAL-BAYĀN ʿAN TAʾWĪL ĀY AL-QURĀʾN 276 (providing a 
narrative about H ̣abībah that includes spousal abuse) (1986–87); 2 ABŪ ISHĀQ IBRĀHĪM IBN ʿALĪ IBN 
YŪSUF FĪRŪZĀBĀDĪ AL-SHĪRĀZĪ (D. 1083; IRAN), AL-MUHADHDHAB FĪ FIQH AL-IMĀM AL-SHĀFIʿĪ 
71–72 (1959) (Shāfi īʿ: narrating that she pursued a khulʿ divorce because her husband was abusive). 
114. Again, this is based on my comparison of muṣannafāt to later collections. See the 
beginning of the section on khulʿ in 2 ʿABD AL-SALĀM IBN SAʿĪD SAHNŪN (D. 854; TUNISIA) ET AL., 
AL-MUDAWWANAH AL-KUBRA LI-IMĀM MĀLIK IBN ANAS AL-ASBAHĪ 241–51 (ʿĪsá ibn Masʿad 
Zawāwī ed., 1994). Reports about a recalcitrant wife and wife-initiated divorce are juxtaposed in 6 AL-
SHĀFIʿĪ, supra note 101 (kitāb al-khulʿ wa al-nushūz ). The section on recalcitrance (nushūz ) appears 
immediately before the section on wife-initiated divorce (khulʿ) in 2 AL-SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 113, at 
71–78 (Shāfi īʿ: section on recalcitrance immediately precedes section on khulʿ). In a different edition: 
2 ABŪ ISHĀQ IBRĀHĪM IBN ʿALĪ IBN YŪSUF FĪRŪZĀBĀDĪ AL-SHĪRĀZĪ (D. 1083; IRAN), AL-
MUHADHDHAB FĪ FIQH AL-IMĀM AL-SHĀFIʿĪ 486–99 (Zakarīyā ʿUmayrāt & Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad 
Baṭṭāl eds., 1995). Some Muslim jurists viewed khulʿ as being only permissible in situations of 
recalcitrance or loathing. KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 68. 
115. See supra text accompanying note 93. 
116. There are no references to this practice in biographical or historical texts; in addition, the 
jurisprudential texts do not cite a Prophetic precedent. In other words, there is no indication in the 
historical sources that a Muslim man in the Prophetic period could divorce a woman without paying 
the full dower. 
117. By “earlier” and “later,” I refer not only to the dating of specific texts, but also to the 
dating of the materials in the texts. Later sources tend to introduce khulʿ in the feminine verbal form, 
but then exclusively or primarily offer examples of men initiating this divorce. See, e.g., 6 AL-SHĀFIʿĪ, 
supra note 101, at 502 (discussing khulʿ as a man’s prerogative). That many legal texts begin the section 
on khulʿ by discussing a woman’s decision to divorce her husband suggests that women had some 
autonomy in this matter. See, e.g., 2 AL-SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 113, at 489 (Shāfī īʿ: section begins, “[I]f a 
woman dislikes her husband . . . she may divorce him . . . ”). Yet, much of the subsequent discussions 
in these texts focus on a husband verbalizing or effecting the divorce through his proclamation. 
118. A husband can divorce through khulʿ and pay less than the full settlement if (a) wife is 
recalcitrant; (b) wife commits a sin; (c) wife is disobedient. 4 ʿABD AL-RAHMĀN JAZĪRĪ ET AL., KITĀB 
AL-FIQH ʿALA AL-MADHĀHIB AL-ARBAʿAH WA MADHHAB AHL AL-BAYT 472–73 (1998) (explaining 
Mālikīs recommended khulʿ divorce of a recalcitrant wife and H ̣anbalis permitted khul  ʿdivorce of a 
recalcitrant wife); see also ʿĀMIR SAʿĪD ZAYBĀRĪ, AHKĀM AL-KHUL  ʿFĪ AL-SHARĪʿAH AL-ISLĀMĪYAH 
75–76 (1997). 
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payment: previously, the wife received the full dower (i.e., consideration) at the 
formation of the marriage contract, but gradually, most dowers were partially paid 
at the contract formation and the remainder was recorded as a kind of debt the 
husband’s estate owed the wife, due at divorce or at his death. This resulted in a 
shift in the procedural mechanism by which a wife initiated divorce: no longer able 
to simply return the dower that was given to her, she had to instead relinquish her 
rights to an unpaid dower in a formal legal process. Regardless of the initiating 
party (wife or husband), jurists debated the classification of khulʿ as a divorce or 
rescission119 and the permissibility of a husband taking more than the dower.120 
To summarize, by the end of the professionalization period, the following 
divorce practices were recognized: 
(1) A husband divorces his wife for whatever reason and pays the divorce 
settlement in full. 
 
119. See supra text accompanying note 98; ʿABD AL-RAHMĀN IBN ʿAMR AWZĀʿĪ (D. 774; 
SYRIA), SUNAN AL-AWZĀʿĪ: AHĀDĪTH WA-ĀTHĀR WA-FATĀWÁ 338 (Marwān Muḥammad al-Shaʿʿār 
ed., 1993) (Awzā īʿ: khulʿ is a divorce); ABŪ YŪSUF, supra note 103, at 129 (Ḥanafī: a separation 
initiated by the wife is irrevocable); 2 ʿABD ALLĀH IBN MUHAMMAD IBN BARAKAH (D. 10TH CENT; 
ʿUMĀN), KITĀB AL-JĀMIʿ 196 (ʿĪsa ́ Yaḥyá Bārūnī ed., 2nd ed. 1974) (Ibāḍī: khulʿ is a revocable 
divorce); ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABD AL-RAHMĀN IBN ABĪ ZAYD AL-QAYRAWĀNĪ (D. 996; TUNISIA), AL-
RISĀLAH AL-FIQHĪYAH 202, 205 (1986) (Mālikī: khulʿ is irrevocable); 2 ABŪ YAʿLA MUHAMMAD IBN 
AL-HUSAYN IBN AL-FARRĀ ʾ (D. 1066; IRAQ), AL-MASĀIʾL AL-FIQHĪYAH MIN KITĀB AL-RIWĀYATAYN 
WA-AL-WAJHAYN 136 (ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad Lāḥim ed., 1985) (Ḥanbalī: khulʿ dissolves 
contracts); 6 MUHAMMAD IBN AHMAD SHAMS AL-DĪN SARAKHSĪ (D. 11TH CENT; TRANSOXANIA), 
KITĀB AL-MABSŪT 171 (1993) (Ḥanafī: khulʿ is irrevocable); 7 HURR AL-ʿĀMILĪ, supra note 110, at 
495 (Imāmī Shī īʿ: khulʿ is irrevocable). Note, there are conflicting opinions within each legal school. 
See MUHAMMAD IBN NASR MARWAZĪ (D. 906; SAMARQAND), IKHTILĀF AL-FUQAHĀ ʾ  301–02 
(Muḥammad Ṭāhir Ḥakīm ed., 2000) (summarizing the opinions of major jurists on the legal 
implications of a khulʿ divorce). Irrevocable divorce (ṭalāq bā iʾn) is the opinion of many late antique 
jurists, as well as Mālik and Aḥmad ibn H ̣anbal (in one of two opinions attested to him); revocable 
divorce (ṭalāq raj īʿ ) is the opinion of the Ẓāhirīs; rescission ( faskh) is the opinion of some late antique 
jurists, as well as al-Shāfi īʿ and Aḥmad ibn H ̣anbal (in one of two opinions attested to him). 
KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 113–17 (summarizing which jurists or legal schools view khulʿ as 
irrevocable divorce, revocable divorce, or rescission); see also ZAYBĀRĪ, supra note 118, at 221–23. 
120. See supra text accompanying note 89. The possibility that a husband could take in excess 
of the dower continued to be a subject of juristic debate. AWZĀʿĪ, supra note 119, at 338 (Awzā īʿ: a 
husband may not take more than the dower in a khulʿ divorce); MĀLIK IBN ANAS (D. 796; ARABIA), 
MUWATTA ʾAL-IMĀM MĀLIK 188–89 (ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ʿAbd al-Laṭīf ed., 2d ed. 1979) (explaining that 
it is unfavorable, but permitted, for a husband to take more than dower in khulʿ); 6 AL-SHĀFIʿĪ, supra 
note 101, at 501 (explaining that a husband may take more than dower); 1 IBN MĀJAH, SUNAN AL-
MUSTAFÁ, supra note 103, at 633 (explaining that a wife returns only her dower, not more, in khulʿ); 2 
IBN BARAKAH, supra note 119, at 195 (Ibād ̣ī: it is not permissible for a husband to take more than the 
dower in khulʿ); IBN ABĪ ZAYD AL-QAYRAWĀNĪ, supra note 119, at 205 (Mālikī: a wife may offer her 
dower, less, or more in khulʿ); 2 YŪSUF IBN ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABD AL-BARR (D. 1070; ANDALUSIA), 
KITĀB AL-KĀFĪ FĪ FIQH AHL AL-MADĪNAH AL-MĀLIKĪ 593 (Muḥammad Muḥammad Aḥīd Wuld 
Mādīk Mūrītānī ed., 1980) (Mālikī: khulʿ is a wife losing entire dower and fidya is wife losing part of 
dower); 7 HURR AL-ʿĀMILĪ, supra note 110, at 493 (Imāmī Shī īʿ: husband may take more than dower 
in khul ,ʿ but not in mubāraaʾh). 
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(2) A husband divorces his wife and pays less than the divorce settlement 
under the category of khulʿ , possibly because the wife is recalcitrant or 
immoral.121 
(3) A court declares a wife divorced and the husband pays the divorce 
settlement for the following reasons: 
(a) if he is impotent or has a severe defect or disease;122 
(b) if he deserts his wife, fails to provide her maintenance, or is cruel;123 
(c) or if he is insane.124 
(4) A wife divorces her husband125 and forfeits the divorce settlement 
(dower) partially, completely, or even pays in excess under specific 
circumstances.126 According to many jurists, the husband’s consent is 
required.127 
(5) Less prevalent than in an earlier period,128 a husband offers his wife the 
 
121. Many late antique jurists and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal prohibit a husband from taking more 
than the wife’s dower; Ḥanafīs do not recommend his taking more; Mālikīs, Shāfi īʿs, and Imāmī Shī īʿs 
permit husbands to take as much as, less than, or more than the dower amount he gave her. The two 
main juristic opinions (for and against a husband taking more than the dower in a khulʿ divorce) are 
summarized in KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 140–43. 
122. “An impotent husband must be allowed a year’s probation after which divorce takes 
place” and the wife is entitled to keep the entire dower. 2 ʿALĪ IBN ABĪ BAKR MARGHĪNĀNĪ (D. 1197; 
FARGHĀNA), THE HIDAYA: COMMENTARY ON THE ISLAMIC LAWS 217 (Ḥanaf ī) (Zahra Baintner 
trans., Darul Ishaat 2007). By the early modern period, H ̣anafī jurists had identified sexual impotence 
as the only valid grounds for a woman to demand a divorce, but also permitted women to include 
numerous stipulations in the marriage contract that would facilitate their divorce rights. See JAZĪRĪ ET 
AL., supra note 118, at passim. 
123. See supra text accompanying note 105; see also 17 ABĪ ZAKARĪYĀ MUHYĪ AL-DĪN IBN 
SHARAF AL-NAWAWĪ (D. 1277; SYRIA) ET AL., AL-MAJMŪ ,ʿ SHARH AL-MUHADHAB 110–12 (Zakarīyā 
ʿAlī Yūsuf ed., 1966–69) (Shāfi īʿ: if a husband cannot support his wife, they are divorced). 
124. But there is a Ḥanafī opinion that a woman cannot demand judicial divorce if her 
husband is mentally incompetent or has a serious disease. 2 MARGHĪNĀNĪ, supra note 122, at 219 
(Ḥanaf ī). 
125. A wife can demand khulʿ if (a) wife finds husband disgusting (incompatibility); (b) 
husband is abusive; (c) wife fears that she cannot be faithful. 6 SARAKHSĪ, supra note 119, at 171 
(Ḥanafī: including a chapter on khulʿ that begins, “[I]f a woman divorces her husband . . . .”). Ibn 
H ̣azm synopsizes juristic opinions by noting that some jurists prohibit khul ,ʿ while others make it 
conditional upon one of the following factors: (a) a political leader permits it; (b) the wife is having an 
affair; (c) the husband is abusive; (d) she refuses to purify herself; (e) she claims that her husband is 
repulsive; (f) she dislikes him and he is not compelling her (to relinquish her dower). ʿALĪ IBN 
AHMAD IBN HAZM (D. 1064; ANDALUSIA), MARĀTIB AL-IJMĀ  ʿ FĪ AL-ʿIBĀDĀT WA-AL-MUʿĀMĀLAT 
WA-AL-IʿTIQĀDĀT 74–75 (Ẓāhirī) (1970); see also 10 ʿALĪ IBN AHMAD IBN HAZM (D. 1064; 
ANDALUSIA), AL-MUHALLĀ 286–97 (Ẓāhirī) (Ḥasan Zaydān Ṭulbah ed., 1967–71) [hereinafter IBN 
HAZM), AL-MUHALLĀ]. 
126. See supra text accompanying note 121. 
127. While all the legal schools accept the validity of khul ,ʿ most legal schools view it as a 
negotiated settlement. 10 IBN HAZM, AL-MUHALLĀ, supra note 125, at  286 (Ẓāhirī: khulʿ is only by 
mutual consent). H ̣anafīs require the husband to accept the wife’s khulʿ offer in order for a divorce to 
be valid. 4 JAZĪRĪ ET AL., supra note 118, at 494. This resembles the common—although likely not 
universal—rabbinic perspective that a husband must deliver a get for a divorce to occur. 
128. See supra text accompanying note 103. Earlier texts discuss this option more than later 
texts. 
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option of choosing divorce or staying with him; if she chooses divorce, 
he pays her a divorce settlement.129 
When compared to the previous period (of legal circles and networks), a 
wife’s ability to initiate divorce was circumscribed. 
C. Consolidation (1050–1400 CE) 
By the eleventh century, Muslim jurists had elaborated more details 
surrounding divorce practices.130 Jurists developed a taxonomy for divorce 
settlements paid by a wife by trying to assign different terms for divorces in which 
the wife loses the dower, or more or less than the dower.131 They also continued 
 
129. IBN ANAS, supra note 120, at 191–92 (giving a wife a divorce option with full dower); 
ABŪ YŪSUF, supra note 103, at 139–41 (Ḥanafī: women given choice to divorce and receive dowers); 2 
BISHR IBN GHĀNIM AL-KHURĀSĀNĪ AL-IBĀDĪ (D. CA. 815; KHURĀSĀN), MUDAWWANAH AL-KUBRÁ 
56–67 (Ibāḍī) (1984); 6 SARAKHSĪ, supra note 119, at 210–23 (Ḥanafī: giving wife divorce option with 
full dower); 2 IBN ʿABD AL-BARR, supra note 120, at 587–91 (Mālikī: giving wife divorce option with 
full dower). But see Ibn Ḥazm, negating the possibility of a woman being given the option of 
choosing divorce. 10 IBN HAZM, AL-MUHALLĀ, supra note 125, at 144–53 (Ẓāhirī). 
130. Ibn Rushd summarizes these medieval juristic perspectives: 
Five opinions are, thus, derived for khul .ʿ First, that is not permitted at all. Second, it is 
permitted in all circumstances, that is, even under duress. Third, it is not permitted unless 
fornication is witnessed. Fourth, it is permitted when there is fear that the limits imposed 
by Allāh will not be maintained. Fifth, that it is permitted in all circumstances, except 
under duress, which is the most widely accepted (mashhūr) opinion. 
2 IBN RUSHD, THE DISTINGUISHED JURIST’S PRIMER: A TRANSLATION OF BIDĀYAT AL-MUJTAHID 
81 (Imran Ashan Khan Nyazee trans., 1996). Duress here refers to a husband forcing his wife to 
accept less than the divorce settlement. 
131. Jurists continued to debate the permissibility of a husband taking more than the 
dower from the wife in khulʿ. Ibn Rushd summarizes this debate: 
The term khulʿ, however, in the opinion of the jurists is confined to her paying him all that 
he spent on her, the term ṣulḥ to paying a part of it, fidya to paying more than it, and 
mubāraʾah to her writing off a claim that she had against him. 
Id. at 79. Still, there is a difference of opinion on the possibility of a husband taking more than the 
divorce settlement in fidya. See 2 ʿALĀʾ AL-DĪN MUHAMMAD IBN AḤMAD SAMARQANDĪ (D. 1144; 
SAMARQAND), TUḤFAT AL-FUQAHĀʾ 301–02 (Muḥammad Zakī ʿAbd al-Barr ed., 1958) (Ḥanafī: 
dominant opinion is that a husband may not take more than dower, but minority opinion permits 
taking more than dower, so the ruling is that if the couple agreed to more than dower, it stands); 2 
MARGHĪNĀNĪ, supra note 122, at 194–95 (Ḥanafī: it is legally permissible for husband to take more 
than the dower); 10 MUWAFFAQ AL-DĪN ʿABD ALLĀH IBN AHMAD IBN QUDĀMAH AL-MAQDĪSĪ (D. 
1223; SYRIA), AL-MUGHNĪ 269–70 (ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Turkī & ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ 
Muḥammad Ḥulw eds., 2d ed. 1992) (Ḥanbalī: it is permissible, but unfavorable, for husband to take 
more than dower; notes conflicting juristic opinions); 2 MAJD AL-DĪN ABĪ AL-BARAKĀT ʿABD AL-
SALĀM IBN ʿABD ALLĀH IBN AL-KHIDR IBN TAYMĪYAH AL-HARRĀNĪ (d. 1254/5; SYRIA/IRAQ), 
MUHARRAR FĪ AL-FIQH ʿALÁ MADHHAB AL-IMĀM AHMAD IBN HANBAL 99 (Shams al-Dīn Ibn 
Mufliḥ al-H ̣anbalī al-Maqdisī et al. eds., 1999) (Ḥanbalī: a khulʿ divorce settlement may not exceed 
dower); JAʿFAR IBN AL-HASAN MUHAQQIQ AL-HILLĪ (D. 1277; IRAQ), MUKHTASAR AL-NĀFIʿ FĪ 
FIQH AL-IMĀMĪYAH 227–28 (Imāmī Shīʿī: discussing debate about fidya) (1967). The majority Shāfiʿī 
opinion permits a husband to take more than the dower as part of the khulʿ divorce settlement, 
whereas the minority Shāfiʿī opinion disapproves of this practice. 16 AL-NAWAWĪ et al., supra note 
123, at 8–9 (Shāfiʿī: discussing divorce settlement amounts); MUHAMMAD IBN MAKKĪ SHAHĪD AL-
AWWAL (D. 1384; SYRIA), AL-LUMʿAH AL-DIMASHQĪYAH FĪ FIQH AL-IMĀMĪYAH 199–200 
(Muḥammad Taqī Murwārīd & ʿAlī Aṣghar Murwārīd eds., 1990) (Imāmī Shīʿī: a husband may take 
more than the dower in khulʿ, but he may not take more than dower in mubāraʾah).  
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to debate the classification of wife-initiated divorce as revocable or irrevocable 
(roughly equivalent to breach and rescission of the marriage contract).132 To 
summarize, H ̣anafīs, Mālikīs, later Shāfiʿ īs, minority Ḥanbalīs, and a majority of 
late antique jurists viewed khulʿ  as equivalent to divorce; but earlier Shāfiʿ īs, a 
majority of H ̣anbalīs, and a minority of late antique jurists considered khulʿ  to be 
recission ( faskh).133 While there is no indication that jurists prohibited any of the 
divorce types previously practiced,134 the distinctions between earlier and later 
legal texts imply that a woman’s access to divorce became limited to particular 
circumstances.135 In theory, women still had the legal right to divorce their 
husbands by paying a divorce settlement.136 Yet, juristic restrictions (as outlined in 
 
132. Zamakhsharī explains that khul  ʿis a divorce (ṭalāq) for H ̣anafīs, whereas it is dissolution 
( faskh) for Shāfi īʿs. The difference is that Ḥanafīs permit reconciliation between the spouses under 
the original contract, whereas Shāfi īʿs do not. MAHMŪD IBN ʿUMAR ZAMAKHSHARĪ (D. 1144; 
KHWĀRAZM), RUŪʾS AL-MASĀʾIL (AL-MASĀʾIL AL-KHILĀFĪYAH BAYNA AL-HANAFĪYAH WA-AL-
SHĀFIʿĪYAH) 404–06 (ʿAbd Allāh Nadhīr Aḥmad ed., 1987); see also 2 SAMARQANDĪ, supra note 131, 
at 299 (Ḥanafī: khulʿ is irrevocable divorce); 3 MAHMŪD IBN AHMAD MARGHĪNĀNĪ (D. 1219/20; 
FARGHĀNA), AL-MUHĪT AL-BURHĀNĪ FĪ AL-FIQH AL-NUʿMĀNĪ 501 (Aḥmad ʿIzzū ʿInāyah ed., 2003) 
(Ḥanafī: khul  ʿ is irrevocable divorce); 10 IBN QUDĀMAH AL-MAQDĪSĪ, supra note 131, at 274–75 
(Ḥanbalī: cites conflicting reports among jurists about khulʿ as divorce or recission); 2 IBN TAYMĪYAH 
AL-HARRĀNĪ, supra note 131, at 98 (H ̣anbalī: khul  ʿ is an irrevocable divorce); AHMAD IBN ʿABD AL-
HALĪM IBN TAYMĪYAH (D. 1328; SYRIA), MAJMŪ  ʿ MIN AL-FATĀWÁ AL-KUBRÁ LIL-IMAM IBN 
TAYMĪYAH § 32, at 289 (Sa īʿd Muḥammad al-Laḥḥām ed., 1993) (Ḥanbalī: cited conflicting reports 
among jurists about khulʿ as divorce or recission); MUHAQQIQ AL-HILLĪ, supra note 131, at 227 
(Imāmī Shī īʿ: summarizing debate on legal status of khulʿ); 3 ʿUTHMĀN IBN ʿALĪ AL-ZAYLAʿĪ AL-
HANAFĪ (D. 1342/3) ET AL., TABYĪN AL-HAQĀʾIQ; SHARH KANZ AL-DAQĀʾIQ 182 (Aḥmad ʿAzzū 
ʿInāyah ed., 2000) (H ̣anafī: khulʿ is an irrevocable divorce). 
133. MUSTAFA DHAHABĪ, AL-KHUL  ʿ WA-AHKĀMUHU FĪ AL-SHARĪʿAH AL-ISLĀMĪYAH 60 
(2000). 
134. For instance, husbands continued to give wives the option of divorce with receipt of the 
full divorce settlement, as evidenced in medieval juristic texts. 2 SAMARQANDĪ, supra note 131, at 
279–88 (Ḥanafī: giving wife divorce option); BURHĀN AL-DĪN AL-FARGHĀNĪ AL-MARGHĪNĀNĪ (D. 
1197; FARGHĀNA), AL-HIDĀYAH: THE GUIDANCE. 593–605 (Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee trans., 
2006) (Ḥanafī: giving wife divorce option); 2 AL-SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 113, at 83–84 (Shāfi īʿ: husband 
gives a wife the option to divorce and receive full dower); 16 AL-NAWAWĪ ET AL., supra note 123, at 
88–93 (Shāfi īʿ: a husband offers a wife a divorce option). Jurists distinguish between “takhyīr (granting 
a choice) and tamlīk (granting possession of the right).” 2 IBN RUSHD, supra note 130, at 84 
(summarizing the juristic debates on these divorce types); see also 1 FATĀWÁ AL-ʿĀLAMGĪRĪYAH 
(1664–1672) 387–409 (Dār Iḥyā  ʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī 1980) (n.d.) (Ḥanafī: men giving women a 
divorce option without losing dower). 
135. Abuse and repulsiveness continued to be cited as grounds for a woman to pursue a khul  ʿ
divorce. For example, a Shāfi īʿ text cites the main ḥadīth (as precedent) about a woman who pursued 
a khulʿ divorce because her husband was abusive, but jurists cautioned against allowing khulʿ when a 
husband is intentionally abusive in order to avoid paying the divorce settlement. 16 AL-NAWAWĪ ET 
AL., supra note 123, at 3–6 (Shāfi īʿ: physical abuse as provoking wife-initiated divorce); 2 NŪR AL-DĪN 
ʿALĪ IBN ABĪ BAKR HAYTHAMĪ (D. 1405), GHĀYAT AL-MAQSŪD FĪ ZAWĀʾID AL-MUSNAD 267–68 
(Khalāf Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Samīʿ ed., 2001) (Shāfi īʿ: implying that Ḥabībah pursued khulʿ because her 
husband was repulsive). 
136. Ibn Rushd notes that “there is no dispute that a woman possessing discretion (a rashīda) 
has a right to transact redemption herself[.]” 2 IBN RUSHD, supra note 130, at 82; see also 10 IBN 
QUDĀMAH AL-MAQDĪSĪ, supra note 131, at 267 (Ḥanbalī: wife has the right to “ransom” divorce); 16 
AL-NAWAWĪ ET AL., supra note 123, at 2 (Shāfi īʿ: “[I]f a woman loathes her husband . . . she may 
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jurisprudential texts) seem to have limited this right to cases where a wife could 
establish grounds for divorce or to situations where the husband concedes to the 
divorce settlement.137 Notably, juristic discussions of wife-initiated divorce often 
occur adjacent to or in conjunction with the topic of recalcitrance.138 Still, 
medieval and early modern court records establish that women continued to 
acquire divorces by forfeiting part or all of their dowers.139 Indeed, it is possible 
that wife-initiated (khulʿ ) divorces superseded judicial grants of divorce in which 
women were given full dowers. 
What this condensed chronology of Muslim women’s access to divorce 
suggests is that jurists gradually interfered with a wife’s ability to divorce her 
husband. Notably, husbands gained the option of divorcing and paying less than 
the standard divorce settlement in a variety of situations. 
IV. DISENCHANTING THE ORTHODOX NARRATIVES140 
Thus far, I have presented two distinct chronologies—one Judaic and the 
other Islamic—in which I outlined historical changes in how jurists of each 
community conceptualized a woman’s right to divorce. In both of these 
chronologies, jurists interpreted the legal opinions and practices of their 
predecessors within a juristic construction of historical “truth” that informs legal 
orthodoxy. The historical evidence presented in these two chronologies contrasts 
 
remove him by [paying] compensation . . . .”). But numerous legal texts apply the term khulʿ to a 
husband divorcing his wife and not paying the full divorce settlement. See, e.g., 2 AL-SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 
113, at 490–91 (Shāfi īʿ). Most legal texts recognize that either spouse may divorce the other through 
khul .ʿ 16 AL-NAWAWĪ ET AL., supra note 123, at 37 (Shāfi īʿ: either spouse initiates khulʿ); 1 FATĀWÁ 
AL-ʿĀLAMGĪRĪYAH (1664–1672), supra note 134, at 488 (Ḥanafī: khul  ʿ in the masculine verbal form). 
There is some inconsistency between the practice being identified as a woman’s option, but specified 
as necessitating a husband’s verbalization of the divorce. 
137. Ibn Rushd explains “the majority held that [redemption divorce] is permitted with the 
mutual consent of the parties, unless consent to pay him is obtained by fear of injury to her.” 2 IBN 
RUSHD, supra note 130, at 81; see also 2 MARGHĪNĀNĪ, supra note 122, at 194 (Ḥanafī: implying that 
khulʿ necessitates mutual consent); 1 FATĀWÁ AL-ʿĀLAMGĪRĪYAH (1664–1672), supra note 134, at 488 
(Ḥanafī: implying through dual verbal form that khulʿ is mutual agreement between spouses). Jurists 
acknowledge that either spouse may initiate khul ,ʿ but do not account for how to deal with a 
husband’s refusal. AHMAD IBN LUʾLUʾ IBN AL-NAQĪB (D. 1368; EGYPT), ʿUMDAT AL-SĀLIK WA-
ʿUDDAT AL-NĀSIK 336 (Ṣāliḥ Muaʾdhdhin et al. eds., 1979) (Shāfi īʿ: khulʿ is permissible when one or 
both spouses want to end the marriage). 
138. 2 IBN TAYMĪYAH AL-HARRĀNĪ, supra note 131, at 95, 97 (Ḥanbalī: section on 
recalcitrance immediately precedes section on khul ʿ); 3 AL-ZAYLAʿĪ AL-HANAFĪ ET AL., supra note 
132, at 185 (Ḥanafī: Prophetic precedent concerning Ḥabibah’s khul  ʿdivorce is explicitly interpreted 
as an example of a woman’s recalcitrance); 1 FATĀWÁ AL-ʿĀLAMGĪRĪYAH (1664–1672), supra note 
134, at 488 (Ḥanafī: associating khulʿ with nushūz of either spouse). Contemporary Egyptian Islamist-
feminist ʿAblah Kah ̣lāwī begins her monograph on khulʿ with a discussion of recalcitrance (nushūz ), 
but argues that recalcitrance is not a condition for khulʿ divorces. KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 64. 
139. See Ronald C. Jennings, Divorce in the Ottoman Sharia Court of Cyprus, 1580–1640, 78 
STUDIA ISLAMICA 155 (1993) (discussing instances of khulʿ divorces in Ottoman Cyprus). 
140. A version of this section was presented as part of a panel I organized on “Comparative 
Contextualizations of Jewish Legal History” at the Association for Jewish Studies annual conference 
in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 20, 2011). 
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with the “orthodox” stories—the reductive narratives that are constructed and 
repeated by historical actors and contemporary scholars. The orthodox Islamic 
legal story elides distinctions between the legal practices of the late antique and 
medieval periods, creating a seamless narrative of women being able to negotiate a 
divorce only by forfeiting their dowers—or more. On its own, the Islamic 
chronology detailed above implies that medieval Muslim jurists construed a 
Prophetic precedent about wife-initiated divorce as requiring a husband’s consent 
or necessitating a husband’s fault; consequently, they elaborated a variety of 
restrictions on wife-initiated divorce. 
The orthodox Jewish legal story narrates legal changes to legitimate 
normative practice. In what is described as the Rabbinic period (70–620 CE), 
women did not have a no-fault divorce option because they could initiate a 
divorce only if they could prove just cause. In the Geonic period (620–1050 CE), 
the rabbis felt “pressured” by the influence of Islamic courts to change existing 
practices by facilitating a no-fault divorce option for women. In the era of the 
Rishonim (1050–1400 CE), the rabbis corrected the “deviant” Geonic practice and 
returned Jewish law to its “original” foundations by prohibiting women from no-
fault divorce. 
The orthodox Islamic narrative obscures that the specific procedural 
requirement of obtaining a husband’s acquiescence to the wife’s divorce initiation 
likely emerged in the medieval period. The orthodox Jewish narrative obscures 
that the Geonic practice of coercing a husband to divorce a “recalcitrant” wife was 
normative for centuries until its gradual undermining in the late medieval period. 
When these two orthodox stories and the two chronologies enumerated above are 
all juxtaposed, a pattern begins to emerge. 
I want to problematize a specific point of intersection between these two 
narratives: the orthodox Jewish narrative characterizes the Geonic enactment 
(taqqanah) as an innovation (i.e., lacking talmudic precedent) caused by Islamic 
“influence” and many scholars accept this perspective.141 The question I want to 
explore is why this Geonic decree has been interpreted—both by some Rishonim 
and by some contemporary scholars—as having deviated from Talmudic 
practice.142 This Geonic decree’s classification is the site of a contest for legal 
 
141. See supra text accompanying note 56. But see 1 FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN 
PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 298 (arguing that wife-initiated divorce was a pre-Islamic Jewish 
custom); see also Westreich, supra note 51, at 16 (“Demanding a divorce . . . did not have to be based 
on any condition, but was based rather on the law of moredet itself. Accordingly, the reason why the 
amoraim do not discuss the right to demand divorce is that it was already known and accepted, rather 
than this being the ‘point of the innovation’ of the condition.”). 
142. My claim is that the characterization of the Geonic decree as deviating from the Talmud 
or as exceeding the limits of Geonic authority is implicitly based on an evaluation of the Geonic 
context. In other words, those Rishonim who rejected the Geonic ordinance as an innovation did so 
because they believed it was “caused” by Islamic influence. Westreich, supra note 3, at 217 (describing 
the opinion of Rishonim: “Halakhic sources explicitly indicate that the aim of this ruling was to 
prevent malicious manipulations in Moslem [sic] courts that forced Jewish men to grant a divorce 
demanded by women claiming ‘repulsion.’”). 
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authority, and I will provide historical and critical evidence to offer an alternative 
understanding of this Jewish law in its presumed “Islamic” context. 
A late medieval rabbinic consensus gradually developed in the West that 
viewed the Geonic decree as an “innovation” caused by the “influence” of Gentile 
courts. Contemporary scholars who presume that the Gentile courts were Islamic 
characterize the Geonic decree as being caused by Islamic pressure—of some 
kind.143 But these two characterizations of “innovation” and “influence” must be 
reevaluated because they obscure a complicated historical struggle for legal 
authority. Discrediting the Geonic legal practice of facilitating a recalcitrant wife’s 
divorce claim may be a manifestation of Western rabbinic authority overpowering 
Eastern rabbinic authority.144 
The implications of the two characterizations that I will challenge are 
manifest in a specific example. There is suggestive evidence of Jewish women 
divorcing their husbands prior to the Islamic period and the interpretation of that 
evidence is driven by interpretations of the Geonic decree. In other words, those 
who view the decree as an extension of a continuous practice (i.e., the Talmud 
sanctions the practice of coercing husbands to divorce a wife) thus recognize that 
Jewish wives had a long-standing ability to initiate unilateral divorce.145 In 
contrast, those who view the decree as a legal “innovation” based on “foreign 
influence” thereby negate the possibility that Jewish wives could initiate divorce 
outside the judicially recognized justifications.146 Therefore, the historical and 
contemporary interpretation of this decree has significant stakes for Jewish legal 
practice and the conventional narratives should be scrutinized. 
 
143. Contemporary scholars perpetuate these assumptions about “innovation” and 
“influence.” For instance, like other contemporary scholars, Brody characterizes the Geonic decree as 
“dictated by profound changes in the circumstances affecting Jewish life in the Muslim world, and 
more particularly in Babylonia, which necessitated a departure from Talmudic law.” BRODY, supra note 
49, at 62 (emphasis added). 
144. Libson suggests that “[r]ejections of geonic rulings are more common among Ashkenazi 
scholars, who allowed themselves more latitude in legal decisions than the Sephardim.” Gideon 
Libson, Halakhah and Law in the Period of the Geonim, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND 
SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW 197, 241 (N. S. Hecht et al. eds., 1996). 
145. See supra text accompanying note 21. Jewish wives appear to have been able to initiate 
divorce in Babylonia (possibly prior to the Geonic decree) and in Palestine (based on a practice of 
including a stipulation in the marriage contract). Elimelech Westreich notes that “between the 
Talmudic period and the time close to the Shulḥan Arukh, Jewish law had sustained a divorce regime 
enabling the woman to coerce her husband to grant a divorce without submitting a defined ground.” 
Westreich, supra note 3, at 207. 
146. See supra text accompanying note 20 (providing various works on conflicting scholarly 
debate surrounding the evidence for Jewish women divorcing their spouses in antiquity and late 
antiquity); see also LIBSON, supra note 50, at 158. 
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A. Reevaluating Causal Influence 
At the time of the Geonic decree (mid-seventh century),147 a minority of the 
population was Muslim and Islamic courts were not adjudicating outside the 
garrison towns established during the Arab/Muslim conquests.148 That a minority 
Muslim presence could have such significant effect on Jewish legal practice as to 
provoke the enactment within decades of the beginning of Iraq’s conquest is 
improbable. In other words, the orthodox narrative’s claim that the Geonim 
“deviated” from Talmudic practice in order to defend against the threat of Muslim 
“influence”—coercive or otherwise—is based on inaccurate historical evidence.149 
The majority population at this time was actually Christian or Zoroastrian; among 
Eastern Christians and Zoroastrians, women returning their dowers in order to 
effect a divorce is a historically-verified practice.150 Since local communities 
operated courts, the Gentile courts that provoked the Geonic decree may not have 
been Islamic even after the Muslim conquests.151 Indeed, wife-initiated divorce 
may not have been the dominant Islamic legal practice, since it was the subject of 
intense juristic debate among Muslims and possibly only one of many legal 
positions.152 Moreover, it is particularly improbable that any potential Islamic legal 
 
147. Libson dates the decree to 650 or 651 CE and while it may be possible to date it to a 
slightly later period, these historical observations hold true. LIBSON, supra note 50, at 111. 
148. Hallaq explains that Islamic law was only applied in the garrison towns and parts of the 
Arabian peninsula for the first several decades after the Prophet’s death. WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE 
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 54–55 (2005). Morony observes that Islamic law was 
not applied to Jews and he suggests that rabbinic authority increased as a result of the non-
involvement of Muslims in their internal legal affairs. MICHAEL G. MORONY, IRAQ AFTER THE 
MUSLIM CONQUEST 320, 518 (1984). In contrast, Libson rejects that the decree’s proximity in time to 
the Arab/Muslim conquests weakens the assumption of influence. Libson, supra note 144, at 238. But 
Libson does not provide historical evidence about the administration of Islamic courts in the mid-
seventh century to substantiate his influence claim. 
149. Indeed, common interpretations of the Geonic decree suggest prejudicial and 
anachronistic assumptions. For example, a contemporary scholar argues that the Geonic decree does 
not represent absorption of legal concepts of one culture into another culture, but rather a defensive 
act of a minority culture against the destructive influence of the surrounding majority culture. 
Yehudah Zvi Stampfer, Islamic Influence in the Divorce Laws of Rav Samuel Ben Hofni Gaon and the Rambam, 
in ʿALE ʿASOR: DIVRE HA-VEʿIDAH HA-ʿASIRIT SHEL HA-HEVRAH LE-HEKER HA-TARBUT HA-
ʿARVIT-HA-YEHUDIT SHEL YEME-HA-BENAYIM 312 (Soc’y for Judaeo-Arabic Studies et al. eds., 
2008). This is based on an inaccurate understanding of history: the majority of the population in Iraq 
(or the Near East more generally) was Christian and did not become Muslim until several centuries 
later. 
150. See infra text accompanying notes 185, 187, 190. Of course, it is not the only practice, 
since “from the reign of Constantine [306–337 CE] onwards, the legislation on divorce was sometimes 
tightened, sometimes relaxed. For a long time, the laws remained much more liberal in the eastern 
empire than in the west.” ANTTI ARJAVA, WOMEN AND LAW IN LATE ANTIQUITY 258 (1996). 
151. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
152. By way of example, Muslim jurists debated the necessity of having a legal justification or 
court involvement for khul .ʿ Two late antique Muslim jurists—al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 728 CE) and Ibn 
Sīrīn (d. 729 CE)—had an exceptional opinion that khul  ʿ is only permissible with judicial oversight. 
KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 69; 6 SARAKHSĪ, supra note 119, at 173 (Ḥanafī: court involvement not 
necessary for khulʿ); 10 IBN QUDĀMAH AL-MAQDĪSĪ, supra note 131, at 268–69 (Ḥanbalī: conflicting 
reports about the necessity of court involvement in khul ʿ); see also DHAHABĪ, supra note 133, at 51–59. 
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“influence” was coercive. The orthodox Jewish narrative inaccurately assumes the 
existence of Islamic influence that is actually negated by historical evidence. 
More probable than the existence or prevalence of Islamic courts is the 
possibility that Jewish women simply knew that non-Jewish women who 
demanded divorces did not have to wait one year, in addition to having relatively 
more expansive inheritance and property rights. Threatened by the possibility of 
Jewish women converting (to any religion), Geonic rabbis likely reduced the 
waiting period; this practical modification can be interpreted as reacting to an 
internal social demand—not necessarily “influence.” In legal terminology, we can 
identify this kind of legal change as “social welfare” or “public interest” and it is 
endemic to all legal systems. Moreover, forum shopping of legal consumers 
shaped legal changes. While Jewish women in the Near East and North Africa 
were able to acquire divorces in rabbinic courts under a recalcitrant wife claim 
throughout the medieval period,153 they apparently still frequented state (i.e., 
Islamic) courts.154 Even in places where rabbinic courts facilitated wife-initiated 
divorce, Jewish women availed themselves of state (i.e., Islamic) courts because 
the Geonic enactment did not prevent Jewish women from accessing other legal 
options.155 To appreciate the dynamics of legal pluralism, we need to recognize 
such complexities as venue shopping and socio-economic barriers to legal 
consumerism. 
 
Gil noted that “there was still no clear-cut Muslim law with regard to divorce.” MOSHE GIL, A 
HISTORY OF PALESTINE, 634–1099, at 164 (Ethel Broido trans., 1992).; see also Libson, supra note 144, 
at 238 (acknowledging the possibility of Islamic legal diversity, but discounting it). 
153. Westreich notes that at the end of the fourteenth century, there were “Jewish 
communities living in a distinctively Moslem [sic] environment where the rebellious wife suit was 
accepted without question.” Westreich, supra note 3, at 216. This was likely practiced in different 
ways. Goitein suggests, based on surviving documentary evidence, that women often initiated 
divorces; Genizah evidence indicates that some powerful women were able to pressure their ex-
husbands to give them considerable divorce settlements that appear to have been larger than their 
dowers. 3 GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 266. 
154. Goitein mentions a Jewish woman who divorced her husband in an Islamic court. 3 
GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 265. On Jews frequenting Islamic courts for divorce, see URIEL I. 
SIMONSOHN, A COMMON JUSTICE: THE LEGAL ALLEGIANCES OF CHRISTIANS AND JEWS UNDER 
EARLY ISLAM 178–80 (2011); see also ARYEH SHMUELEVITZ, THE JEWS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
IN THE LATE FIFTEENTH AND THE SIXTEENTH CENTURIES: ADMINISTRATIVE, ECONOMIC, 
LEGAL, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS AS REFLECTED IN THE RESPONSA 67 (1984) (“[S]ixteenth century 
matrimonial cases were frequently referred to Muslim law courts.”). Pertaining to the early modern 
period, Al-Qattan notes: 
The frequency and ease with which Jewish and Christian men and women went to the 
Muslim court in connection with marriage and divorce suggests, on the one hand, that 
such recourse was neither unusual nor fraught with communally burdensome 
consequences. It also illustrates the ways in which Christian and Jewish women availed 
themselves of the wife-instigated kinds of divorce not available to them according to the 
rules of their respective faiths. 
Najwa Al-Qattan, Dhimmis in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination, 31 INT’L J. 
MIDDLE E. STUD. 429, 435 (1999). 
155. It may, however, be the case that (rabbinic) Jewish women continued to seek judicial 
divorce decrees from state (i.e., Islamic) courts in situations where a Jewish husband refused to deliver 
a divorce decree. 
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In addition, the “influence” theory does not sufficiently explain how the 
Geonic enactment “protected” the Jewish community from two realities: the 
availability of state (such as Islamic courts) that facilitated a Jewish wife’s divorce 
and the possibility of conversion.156 The orthodox narrative claims that Jewish 
women who had to wait twelve months for a divorce fell into indecency (i.e., illicit 
affairs) or apostatized (presumably becoming Muslim).157 Ostensibly, the Geonim 
dispensed with the long waiting period in order to hasten a Jewish woman’s 
divorce and prevent her apostasy for the purpose of divorcing her Jewish 
husband.158 Yet a Jewish woman who became Muslim would not necessarily have 
been automatically divorced because this Islamic doctrine was not clearly 
established in the mid-seventh century.159 
How might the Geonic rabbis have compelled a husband to deliver a divorce 
 
156. LIBSON, supra note 50, at 111. 
157. An anonymous thirteenth century text identifies both moral indecency and apostasy as 
causal factors motivating the Geonic decree. RISKIN, supra note 25, at 52–53. 
158. By the early medieval era, the consensus of Muslim jurists was that a married woman 
who became Muslim would be divorced unless her husband also converted within her divorce waiting 
period. 5 MUHAMMAD IBN IDRĪS AL-SHĀFIʿĪ (D. 820; ARABIA/EGYPT), MAWSŪʿAT AL-IMĀM AL-
SHĀFIʿĪ AL-KITĀB AL-UMM: KITĀB AL-NIKĀH 149 (Aḥmad Badr al-Dīn Ḥassūn ed., 1996) (Shāfi īʿ: if 
a woman becomes Muslim and her husband does not convert within the waiting period, they are 
divorced); 2 SAHNŪN ET AL., supra note 114, at 216 (Mālikī: a woman’s conversion to Islam 
constitutes divorce unless husband converts within waiting period); 2 TIRMIDHĪ, supra note 109, at 
405 (reporting that a husband of the Prophet’s daughter became Muslim within her waiting period 
and that this is the opinion of Mālik ibn Anas, al-Awzā īʿ, al-Shāfi īʿ, Aḥmad, and Isḥāq); IBN ABĪ 
ZAYD AL-QAYRAWĀNĪ, supra note 119, at 196 (Mālikī: a non-Muslim woman who becomes Muslim is 
divorced from her non-Muslim husband unless he converts); 7 IBN HAZM, AL-MUHALLĀ, supra note 
125, at 364 (Ẓāhirī: a woman who becomes Muslim while married to a non-Muslim is divorced 
immediately); 2 AL-SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 113, at 456 (Shāfi īʿ: a woman who becomes Muslim is 
divorced after the waiting period unless her husband also converts); 10 IBN QUDĀMAH AL-MAQDĪSĪ, 
supra note 131, at 8–10 (Ḥanbalī: a woman who becomes Muslim is divorced after the waiting period 
unless her husband also converts); 15 AL-NAWAWĪ ET AL., supra note 123, at 451–59 (Shāfi īʿ: a 
woman’s conversion to Islam is divorce). 
159. It is unclear if the seventh-century Muslim community viewed the conversion of a wife 
as automatically resulting in a divorce. The main precedential authority for this doctrinal rule is that 
the Prophet’s daughter (Zaynab) became Muslim prior to her husband (Abī al-ʿĀṣī) and the latter was 
not forced to convert, although he did so eventually. There are other reports from the Prophetic era 
about non-Muslim husbands being given time (one month to several months) to convert after their 
wives became Muslim. Many sources suggest that a non-Muslim woman who became Muslim had the 
option of divorce or staying with her non-Muslim husband. 7 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 173–75 
(reporting conflicting narratives about the effects of conversion on marriage between Muslim woman 
and non-Muslim man); 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 109–10 (reporting conflicting opinions 
about a woman who converts, either she is divorced or she can choose to stay with her non-Muslim 
husband). Medieval jurists seem to have understood the Prophetic practice of giving husbands an 
opportunity to convert as corresponding to the divorce waiting period. See, e.g., 2 SAHNŪN ET AL., 
supra note 114, at 211–15 (Mālikī). But there are reports that the length of time between Zaynab’s 
conversion and her husband’s conversion was significantly longer than the divorce waiting period of a 
few months. 2 TIRMIDHĪ, supra note 109, at 405 (citing six years between the conversion of the 
Prophet’s daughter and her husband). Similarly, Ibn ʿAbbās reports that the Prophet’s daughter 
became Muslim eight years prior to her husband and jurists offered various “rationalizations” for why 
this length of time either did not constitute a precedent or was inaccurate. 10 IBN QUDĀMAH AL-
MAQDĪSĪ, supra note 131, at 10–11 (Ḥanbalī). 
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decree instantaneously when husbands very often delayed the process? If the 
Geonic practice removed the twelve-month waiting period and then relied on 
coercing the husband to grant a wife a divorce, the “threat” of conversion to 
Islam remained. That is, a Jewish woman might simply become Muslim and 
demand a judicial divorce decree from an Islamic court, rather than wait for her 
husband to deliver her divorce decree under coercion. It is no coincidence then 
that the Qaraites—in the eleventh century or earlier—accepted judicial divorce 
decrees and that Maimonides denounced the practice as heretical.160 Notably, the 
specific wording of several Geonic texts implies that courts granted or gave Jewish 
women divorces, without explicitly delineating that the courts coerced husbands 
to deliver divorce decrees.161 While we cannot make conclusions based on this 
precise terminology, it is likely that judicial divorce decrees became a site of Jewish 
orthodox contestation in the medieval period. It was not only Muslim “influence” 
that concerned the rabbis, but also the sectarian influence of Qaraites. Western 
rabbinic jurists may have marked the boundaries of rabbinic orthodoxy against 
Qaraite “heresy” through this particular legal issue. The extent to which 
generalizations may be made from this case study to broader processes of 
sectarian resistance and regional competition in the shaping of rabbinic Jewish 
orthodoxy is a matter for further research. 
B. Giving Voice to the Geonim 
Most Geonim did not view their practice of facilitating wife-initiated divorce 
as divergent from Talmudic traditions.162 The Geonic enactment included two 
components: (a) the removal of the twelve-month waiting period (stipulated in the 
Babylonian Talmud) for the recalcitrant wife and (b) coercion of the husband to 
 
160.  
Au XIe siècle, probablement sous influence musulmane, la loi caraïte évolue vers le 
renforcement des droits de la femme. Dorénavant, le divorce peut être effectué à la 
demande de la femme par le tribunal, si le mari refuse de rédiger la lettre de divorce. Cette 
possibilité de divorce par decision juridique constitue une difference important par rapport 
au droit rabbanite. Par consequent, un divorce caraïte obtenu de telle façon ne pouvait être 
valable selon la loi rabbanite. Cependant, il semble que le divorce par decision juridique 
avait un caractère exceptionnel et que la façon la plus répandue de divorcer nécessitait 
toujours la redaction d’une letter par le mari. En effet, la Geniza du Caire ne nous fournit 
que des exemples de ce dernier type de documents. 
Judith Olszowy-Schlanger, La Lettre de Divorce Caraïte et sa Place Dans les Relations Caraïtes et Rabbanites au 
Moyen Age, 155 REVUE DES ÉTUDES JUIVES 337, 342 (1996). I disagree with the author’s 
characterization of this Qaraite practice as being based on Islamic “influence.” See also MAIMONIDES, 
supra note 72, Hilchot Gerushin, 2:20 at 177–78. Maimonides’ critique of non-Jewish courts coercing 
Jewish husbands is evidence that the practice existed, but not a negation of the possibility that non-
rabbinic courts provided judicial divorce decrees. 
161. By way of example, see the following responsum: “After the gemara, our rabbis decreed 
that even what she holds (from him) we take from her and we give her a divorce immediately . . . .” 
HARKAVY, supra note 62, § 71 (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying note 52. 
162. Westreich notes that “according to the Geonim, the source of the halakha coercing the 
husband to grant a divorce to his rebellious wife is the Talmud itself. Several geonic writings indeed 
state so specifically.” Westreich, supra note 3, at 209; see also 1 FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN 
PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 324. 
           
2014] EVERY LAW TELLS A STORY 51 
grant a recalcitrant wife a divorce.163 The Geonim perceived the first component 
as new, but not the second.164 Yet, later rabbinic authorities interpreted both 
components of the decree as “innovative,” despite the Geonic perspective that 
they had preserved rabbinic Jewish tradition.165 The orthodox narrative thereby 
marks as heretical the prolonged practice of Geonic communities who facilitated 
wife-initiated divorce.166 
The characterization of the Geonic decree as an “innovation” is motivated 
by the causal presumption of “influence.” It is commonly assumed that the 
availability of divorce for women in contemporaneous Islamic courts led Geonic 
rabbis to modify divorce practices.167 However, Geonic texts do not explicitly 
identify Islamic courts as being a causal influence on the decree. For example, 
Naṭrōnāī ben Hilāī (or Natronai Gaon, d. ninth century, Iraq) explained the 
rationale for the decree as so “that Jewish women should not stray towards 
lewdness and indecency.”168 Some Geonic sources do not mention a reason for 
the enactment.169 Of course, these Geonim may have been influenced by Islamic 
legal practices and simply did not admit it. But in analyzing this historical event, 
we should focus on the consistency and plausibility of historical interpretations. In 
light of the aforementioned historical evidence, early Geonim did not cite Islamic 
“influence” for the decree because no such “influence” existed in their time. 
In contrast, Sherira ben H ̣anina (Sherira Gaon, d. 1006 CE, Iraq), writing in 
the late tenth century, identified the decree as being an attempt to prevent Jewish 
women from asking Gentile courts to coerce their husbands because only a Jewish 
 
163. A third aspect concerns the dower payment since Geonim made it collectable on 
movable property. Libson, supra note 144, at 237. I suspect that it may be possible to add a fourth 
aspect: the possibility that rabbinic courts granted Jewish women divorces without requiring a formal 
deliverance of the divorce decree from the husband. But this possibility necessitates more research 
than the scope of this Article allows. 
164. Since the Geonim identified the Talmud as the source for (b), only (a) was perceived by 
them as innovative. Libson explains, “Rav Sherira holds—and this seems to be the view of all the 
Geonim—that the compulsory nature of the divorce had already been laid down in the Talmud, the 
only new element in the taḳḳanah being the stipulation that divorce be granted forthwith, without 
delay.” Id.; see also Westreich, supra note 3, at 209. 
165. This is reflected in much of the scholarly literature. By way of example, Libson notes that 
“since the talmudic text itself could not be easily interpreted and the details of the taḳḳanah itself were 
not known, the interpretation became a matter of controversy among the Geonim themselves. It is 
therefore difficult to determine the taḳḳanah’s precise degree of deviation from talmudic law proper.” 
Libson, supra note 144, at 236 (emphasis added). 
166. By way of example, Genizah evidence indicates that in Palestinian marriage contracts of 
the tenth and eleventh centuries, “Either party was empowered, thereby, to demand a divorce for 
purely subjective reasons and was not compelled to prove cause.” 1 FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE 
IN PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 330. 
167. “There is no doubt that the redress open to women in the Shariʿa courts spurred the 
geonim to provide similar redress in Jewish law.” LIBSON, supra note 50, at 111; see also Westreich, 
supra note 3, at 217–18. 
168. RISKIN, supra note 25, at 51. 
169. Halakhot Gedolot does not explain the enactment’s rationale. Id. at 48–49. 
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court can legitimately coerce a Jewish husband to divorce his wife.170 In Sherira 
Gaon’s lifetime, Islamic courts were prevalent and, when petitioned by Jewish 
wives, they probably coerced Jewish husbands to deliver divorce decrees—or 
possibly granted divorce decrees to Jewish wives. Sherira Gaon may have 
anachronistically interpreted the reasons for the seventh-century Geonic decree 
based on his own reality; that is, since Sherira was surrounded by Islamic courts, 
he may have simply assumed that his Geonic predecessors were likewise 
“competing” with Muslim jurists for Jewish litigants. Notably, Sherira Gaon is the 
only known Geonic figure to attribute the influence of Gentile courts to the 
Geonic decree.171 
C. Which Context? 
What is problematic about “influence” as a characterization for a particular 
historical event? “Influence” is very often code for “infiltration” or “impurity.” 
The orthodox understanding of the Geonic decree focuses on the causal factors 
(rather than context) that led to its enactment and presents the decree’s gradual 
overturning as if it occurred in the absence of causal factors (or a context). The 
orthodox Jewish narrative validates a specific bias that can be identified in terms 
of time (medieval era) and space (the West): it was Western Rishonim who 
characterized the Geonic decree as unorthodox.172 What is notable about the 
orthodox narrative is that Western Christian “influences” are unacknowledged or 
minimized, while Islamic “influences” are vilified—and both legal systems are 
drastically oversimplified.173 Moreover, the distinctions within Christian teachings 
on divorce may reflect discrete regional practices.174 
While it is not surprising that Western Rishonim did not describe their 
 
170. Id. at 58–59; see also 2 ELON, supra note 56, at 659–60. 
171. RISKIN, supra note 25, at 74 (citing Tykocinski as having made this observation). 
172. See supra text accompanying note 82 (discussing “Western” Rishonim who overruled 
North African practices in the late fourteenth century). This is also discernible in the writing of 
Maimonides. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
173. In reference to (Christian) Europe, Westreich, for example, claims that 
the influence of the Gentile environment also affected the decline of the rebellious woman 
ground, ultimately leading to its abolition. This influence, however, is indirect, as Jewish 
society internalizes the social norms of the Gentile environment as a result of a prolonged 
encounter, and projects them onto Jewish law through a complex mutual relationship 
whose stages cannot be traced. 
Westreich, supra note 3, at 218. Compare this to Westreich’s description of Islamic influence: 
Halakhic sources explicitly indicate that the aim of this ruling was to prevent malicious 
manipulations in Moslem [sic] courts that forced Jewish men to grant a divorce demanded 
by women claiming ‘repulsion’ . . . . [T]he geonic ordinance clearly originated as a result of 
factors that, although directly affecting Jewish circumstances, were extraneous to Halakhah. 
Id. at 217–18. The historical evidence presented above establishes that no such Islamic “influence” 
existed for the Geonic decree. 
174. The Greek, but not the Hebrew, version of the Gospel of Matthew 5:31-32 limits a 
husband’s grounds for divorcing his wife to adultery. GEORGE HOWARD, THE GOSPEL OF 
MATTHEW ACCORDING TO A PRIMITIVE HEBREW TEXT 204 (1987); see also supra text accompanying 
note 150. 
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annulling of the Geonic decree as being the result of Western “influence,” it is 
remarkable that contemporary scholars perpetuate this selective application of the 
notion of “influence.” Westreich, for instance, noted that “the process of erosion 
[of the recalcitrant wife divorce] moved along the lines of advance of Christian 
society, which gradually conquered and dominated areas that had so far been 
under Moslem [sic] influence and control, at least in Spain.”175 Westreich explicitly 
observes that Rabbeinu Tam’s legal opinion against the recalcitrant wife divorce 
occurred “as Christian society became monogamous and imposed Catholic laws 
making divorce impossible.”176 Moreover, it is possible that Rabbeinu Tam (d. 
1171) felt compelled to oppose wife-initiated divorce because his German 
predecessor, Rabbeinu Gershom (d. 1028) had “enacted a decree which made it 
impossible for a husband to divorce his wife against her will.”177 Since Western 
Jewish men had lost their ability to unilaterally divorce their wives, it became 
necessary to limit the divorce options of Western Jewish women in similar ways. 
Contemporary scholars pose a question about the “influences” that provoked the 
Geonic decree, but not about the “influences” that led to the overturning of that 
decree. 
To be clear, I am not arguing for Western-Christian “influence” on the 
Western Rishonim; to do so would replace one problematic “influence” paradigm 
with another. Instead, I contend that all legal communities produce law in social 
contexts; indeed, law cannot be disentangled from society. Just as the Geonim read 
the Talmud through the intellectual concerns and socio-political realities of their 
times, so too did the Western Rishonim. These two historical moments—the 
enactment of the Geonic decree and its abolition by Western Rishonim—are both 
reflective of, and mediated by, jurists enmeshed in their societies. Late medieval, 
Western jurists marked a seventh-century Geonic decree as an “innovation” 
caused by Gentile “influence” within a struggle for legal authority: the Geonic 
decree was marked as “deviant” not because it occurred under Gentile 
“influence,” but because its revocation occurred in a Western-Christian context. 
Contemporary scholars delineated the “other” by placing a Jewish law in an 
imagined “Islamic” context—instead of a historical one. Both some Western 
Rishonim and some contemporary scholars employ a notion of “influence” that 
manifests reductive causality and, thereby, is an impediment to deeper and more 
complex understanding of legal change. Probing relationships and 
contextualization can move us beyond simplified notions of “influence” that are 
themselves legal-political strategies. 
The extent to which generalizations may be made from this case to broader 
processes of sectarian resistance and regional competition in the shaping of 
rabbinic Jewish orthodoxy is a matter for further research.178 To understand each 
 
175. Westreich, supra note 3, at 218. 
176. Id. 
177. RISKIN, supra note 25, at xii. 
178. Libson observed that “[a]lthough [the recalcitrant wife decree] was recorded in geonic 
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legal system’s transformations, we need to recognize the unending dialectic 
between internal legal logic and changing socio-political circumstances. In the next 
section, I narrate wife-initiated divorce outside the orthodox framework, with the 
background of Near Eastern legal culture. 
V. AN INTERWOVEN NARRATIVE OF WIFE-INITIATED DIVORCE 
A. Antiquity and Late Antiquity (up to 800 CE) 
While most Near Eastern legal systems in antiquity appear to have granted 
men an unencumbered right to divorce,179 women were not precluded from 
divorcing their husbands. Indeed, there is evidence of women initiating 
divorces,180 which may have taken place by the act of the wife leaving the home.181 
Common Near Eastern customs are apparent in some surviving ancient 
Mesopotamian legal texts; as in the case of Jewish divorce practices in antiquity, 
there is a scholarly debate on the issue of a woman’s ability to divorce in ancient 
Mesopotamian law.182 The nature of the surviving historical evidence (primarily 
legal texts and some court records) results in this inconsistency in the historical 
interpretation surrounding women and divorce in the ancient Near East. But it 
may be concluded that the ambiguous nature of the historical evidence itself 
reflects a diverse legal reality in which some wives did divorce their husbands and 
others did not.183 Despite a male, jurisprudential rhetoric legitimating divorce as a 
 
codificatory works, such as Halakhot Peṣuk ̣ot and Halakhot Gedolot, it did not win acceptance in later 
rabbinic literature—a fate similar to that of many other taḳḳanot and customs from the geonic 
period.” Libson, supra note 144, at 238. 
179. DAVID L. LIEBER ET AL., DIVORCE 710–11 § 5 (Michael Berenbaum & Fred Skolnik 
eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
180. Roman provincial law recognized wife-initiated divorce and was likely practiced 
throughout the Near East. GILLIAN CLARK, WOMEN IN LATE ANTIQUITY: PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN 
LIFESTYLES 18 (1993). Jewish women divorced their husbands in second century Egypt and in 
Palestine under Roman law. See Brewer, supra note 20, at 354. The main source for Zoroastrian law is 
the Mādigān ī hazār dādistān and it is commonly dated to approximately 620 CE. MĀDIGĀN Ī HAZĀR 
DĀDISTĀN [THE BOOK OF A THOUSAND JUDGEMENTS: A SASANIAN LAW-BOOK] (A.G. 
Perikhanian trans., Mazda Publishers in association with Bibliotheca Persica 1997) (620 CE); DAS 
SASANIDISCHE RECHTSBUCH “MATAKDAN I HAZAR DATISTAN” (TEIL II) 25–29, 97–120 (Maria 
Macuch trans., 1981). This text notes, “When a woman having got divorce on the woman’s own 
inclination . . . .” SOHRAB JAMSHEDJEE BULSARA, THE LAWS OF THE ANCIENT PERSIANS AS 
FOUND IN THE “MÂTÎKÂN Ê HAZÂR DÂTASTÂN” OR “THE DIGEST OF A THOUSAND POINTS OF 
LAW” 72 (1937). 
181. By way of example, Sealey points out that marriage in ancient Greece was not public and 
did not necessitate judicial involvement. RAPHAEL SEALEY, THE JUSTICE OF THE GREEKS 68 n.30 
(1994). 
182.  RUSS VERSTEEG, EARLY MESOPOTAMIAN LAW 88 (2000) (“Scholars disagree as to 
whether a wife had the legal capacity to divorce her husband.”); RAYMOND WESTBROOK, OLD 
BABYLONIAN MARRIAGE LAW 79 (1988) (“The right of a wife to divorce her husband in OB [Old 
Babylonian] law has been the subject of considerable dispute.”). . 
183. Westbrook concludes that the conflicting evidence of a wife’s ability to initiate divorce is 
the manifestation of “the difference between theory and practice.” WESTBROOK, supra note 182, at 
85. 
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male prerogative, women could and did divorce their husbands in practice. At 
least in some cases, women in the ancient Near East had to seek judicial 
intervention in order to divorce their husbands.184 Even this condensed “pre-
history” suggests that, by the late antique period, there were diverse Near Eastern 
customary practices of men divorcing women, women divorcing men, and judges 
intervening to effect divorces. 
Underlying these practices is a specific economic reality: men paid for both 
marriages and divorces. Ancient Near Eastern legal texts consistently reference 
divorce in terms of men paying divorce settlements.185 Since the default Near 
Eastern norm was for husbands to pay dowers to their wives as part of the 
marriage process, they maintained stronger privileges to divorce, which also 
entailed payment of a divorce settlement to the wife. This is why women who 
divorced their husbands paid for this prerogative in nearly all late antique Near 
Eastern legal cultures—Jewish, Byzantine, and Islamic.186 Indeed, a basic 
presumption in the region seems to have been that if a wife returned her entire 
dower, then that act in and of itself constituted divorce.187 For example, late 
antique divorce documents (written in Greek on papyrus) from Nessana indicate 
that Christian women—both prior to and soon after the Arab/Islamic conquest—
relinquished their dowers in order to acquire a divorce.188 Juxtaposed with the 
 
184. The Laws of Hammurabi (ca. 1750 BCE) mention that if a wife repudiates her husband, 
an inquiry is made; if she is found to be not at fault, then she takes her dowry and leaves, but if she is 
found to be at fault, she is thrown into the water. MARTHA T. ROTH, LAW COLLECTIONS FROM 
MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR 108 (2d ed. 1997). Likewise, Johns asserts that “[i]t was far harder 
for a woman to secure a divorce from her husband. She could do so, however, but only as the result 
of a lawsuit. As a rule, the marriage-contracts mention death as her punishment, if she repudiates her 
husband.” C. H. W. JOHNS, BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS, CONTRACTS AND LETTERS 143 
(1904). 
185. Laws of Ur-Namma (ca. 2100 BCE) §§ 9–11 (indicating that a man pays upon divorcing 
wife, based on wife’s status); ROTH, supra note 184, at 18; see also Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (ca. 1930 BCE) 
§§ 28, 30 (limiting a man’s ability to divorce his first wife; indicates that men pay divorce settlement); 
Id. at 31–32; Sumerian Laws Handbook of Forms (ca. 1700 BCE) iv 12–16 (requiring that a husband 
pays the divorce settlement); Id. at 50; Laws of Eshnunna (ca. 1770 BCE) § 59 (punishing a husband 
financially for divorcing a wife who is mother of his children); Id. at 68; Laws of Hammurabi (ca. 1750 
BCE) §§ 137–41 (requiring that a husband who divorces wife with whom he has children pays her 
dowry and half of his assets, and that a husband who divorces wife who is childless, pays a divorce 
settlement that varies depending on the status of the wife); Id. at 107. One exception is Middle 
Assyrian Laws (ca. 1076 BCE) A §§ 37–38 (allowing that a husband may divorce wife without paying 
divorce settlement). Id. at 167. 
186. In late antique Roman provincial (or Christian) law: “A woman who divorced without 
grounds lost dowry and gifts and had to wait five years to remarry; a man who divorced without good 
reason merely lost dowry and gifts.” CLARK, supra note 180, at 24; see also Judith Evans Grubbs, 
“Pagan” and “Christian” Marriage: The State of the Question, 2 J. EARLY CHRISTIAN STUD. 361, 366 (1994) 
(noting that after Constantine, husbands could financially benefit if divorce was the wife’s “fault”). 
187. Case in point: while ketubbah actually means marriage contract, it is commonly used in 
rabbinic literature to refer specifically to the dower payment. In other words, the marriage contract 
and the dower are equivalent. 
188. There are two relevant papyri from Nessana (in the Negev). The first (document 33), 
which dates to the sixth century (pre-Islamic) is between Stephan and Sergius, father of Sarah; 
Stephan retained the dowry and was given back the dower in order to divorce Sarah. 3 CASPER J. 
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evidence from Jewish and Islamic sources cited above, this suggests that women in 
the late antique Near East—regardless of confessional identity—relinquished 
dowers in order to divorce their husbands. 
These divorce-based monetary exchanges resemble the conceptually related 
slavery and ransoming practices of the region. At the level of terminology, slaves 
could financially redeem themselves to receive a manumission decree in a manner 
that mimics a divorce decree in Jewish law.189 Similarly, the Qurʾānic verse that 
grants women the option of initiating divorce indicates that women may “ransom” 
themselves.190 There is a late antique exception that, perhaps, proves the rule: 
while a wife may repudiate her husband according to the late antique Corpus Juris 
Civilis (Roman legal code), the husband does not pay a dower, whereas the wife 
pays a dowry in order to marry and her husband profits from it during the 
marriage.191 Moreover, Near Eastern women of higher social status had relatively 
more access to divorce, further indicating that financial means figured into a 
woman’s ability to procure a divorce.192 
Recognition of the diversity of late antique Near Eastern legal practices and 
women’s agency suggests that there were a variety of legal maneuvers for women 
to obtain divorces. It should be noted that judicial involvement likely varied 
according to region—with some areas functioning without an official court. We 
may characterize this period as being legally heterodox. 
 
KRAEMER, EXCAVATIONS AT NESSANA: NON-LITERARY PAPYRI 104–06 (1958). The second 
(document 57) dates to 689 CE (post-Islamic, under the Umayyad empire) and is an agreement 
between Nonna and John (a priest) that is signed by seven witnesses. Id. at 161–67. Nonna’s 
document states that she “waives all property claims, and asks for a divorce or release.” Id. at 162. 
Kraemer suggests that document 57 is related to a libellus repudii—a document of repudiation that 
Theodosius II (d. 450 CE) required (in Nov. Th. 12 pr. enacted in 439 CE) either spouse to send to 
the other in a divorce. Kraemer further proposes that document 57 resembles other sixth century 
papyri of repudiations—including one (POxy 129) sent from a father-in-law to a husband. Id. 
189. MISHNAH, Gīṭṭīn 1:4 (comparing delivery of divorce and emancipation documents). 
PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Gīṭṭīn 1:3 (describing that writs of divorce and writs of manumission are 
treated the same). The slave’s emancipation decree is get shikhrūr ( ִׁשְחרּור ֵּגט ), and a woman’s divorce 
decree is get nashīm (ם  See also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gīṭṭīn 9a (revealing similarities between .(ֵּגט נִָׁש
divorce and emancipation documents); Qiddushin 16a (discussing slaves redeeming themselves by 
payment). 
190. Qurʾān 2:229 (explaining that a wife may “redeem” herself from a marriage). 
191. DIG. 23.3.1 et seq (explaining that a woman pays dowry at marriage); DIG. 24.3.1 et seq 
(elaborating various dowry-related cases and husband’s rights to dowry’s profits); DIG. 24.2.1 et seq 
(providing that a wife or husband may repudiate spouse). Although redacted in the sixth century, the 
Digest of Justinian contains legal traditions dating to earlier generations, including to the Roman 
republican period. Beirut’s Roman law school was destroyed in an earthquake in 551 CE, and it is 
unclear to what extent formal Roman law was subsequently taught or practiced in the region. 
192. For instance, in the Parthian period, “In contrast to the legal limitations imposed upon 
the commoners, the noblewomen could easily divorce their husbands. This class privilege, judging by 
the tenacity of legal and social institutions, must have continued in Sasanian times.” Muhammad A. 
Dandamayev et al., Divorce, ENCYCLOPEDIA IRANICA (Dec. 15, 1995), http://ww.iranicaonline 
.org/articles/divorce. This same article notes that a woman who consents to divorce loses some of 
her financial rights. Also, in Palestine, “Some rich or influential Jewish women divorced their 
husbands under the Roman law.” Brewer, supra note 20, at 356. 
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B. Medieval Era (800–1400 CE) 
Legal systematization and professionalization transformed legal practice in 
the Near East. Marriage and divorce became institutionalized in the medieval era. 
By the twelfth century, divorce became a primarily court-mediated process and 
some court intervention became normative for most divorce situations.193 The 
professionalization and centralization of legal education resulted in the 
consolidation of juristic opinions.194 Some form of legal orthodoxy is evident in 
both Jewish and Islamic legal texts that present a hierarchy of divorce practices: 
(1) husband divorces wife and pays full divorce settlement; 
(2) court divorces husband and wife because of husband’s impotence, 
defects, or unreasonable behavior; husband pays full divorce settlement; 
(3) husband divorces wife or wife divorces husband; husband does not pay 
divorce settlement or pays only part of the settlement because wife has 
agreed to accept less or has been declared recalcitrant. 
The third category is an intentional collapse of two distinct forms of divorce 
that became ambiguous in the medieval period. The divorce of a recalcitrant wife 
in the Jewish legal tradition and the forfeiting wife in the Islamic legal tradition are 
procedurally the same: they are both situations of women acting to divorce their 
husbands and losing some money in the process. Similarly, the formalist 
expectation that a Jewish husband deliver a divorce decree or that a Muslim 
husband consent to the wife’s divorce settlement are both legal-formalist 
perspectives that gained ascendancy in the medieval periods. 
It may be possible to discern similar shifts in juristic views of marriage and 
divorce in how jurists adjudicated temporary marriage: widely practiced in late 
antiquity, temporary marriages were gradually marked as deviant in the medieval 
era by Sunnī jurists.195 One of the reasons Sunnī jurists offered as evidence of 
temporary marriage’s illegitimacy is that, since the marriage automatically expired 
at the end of the specified duration, it did not end with a divorce.196 Orthodox 
 
193. That wife-initiated divorce occurred in an earlier period without court intervention is 
substantiated by juristic texts. See supra text accompanying note 152. 
194. The transformation of study circles or networks into academies was a regional process 
evident among both Muslims and Jews. On the apprenticeship or study circle model of rabbinic legal 
education prior to the Islamic period, see DAVID M. GOODBLATT, RABBINIC INSTRUCTION IN 
SASANIAN BABYLONIA (1975). For a similar narrative history of Islamic legal instruction, see 
HALLAQ, supra note 148, at 57–78. 
195. Both Jews and Muslims appear to have practiced temporary marriages throughout the 
late antique period, but gradually marked it as heretical. The legitimacy of temporary marriages 
became a sectarian issue between Sunnīs and Shī īʿs in the tenth century. I presented a paper on 
temporary marriage among medieval Muslims and Jews with Zvi Septimus at the Jewish Law 
Association meeting on July 31, 2012; we are preparing an article for publication that expounds on 
that presentation. 
196. 7 ʿALĪ IBN MUHAMMAD TABĀTABĀʾĪ (D. CA. 1816), RIYĀD AL-MASĀIʾL FĪ BAYĀN AL-
AHKĀM BI-AL-DALĀIʾL 25 (1992) (Imāmī Shī īʿ: there is no divorce in a temporary marriage); 2 AL-
SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 113, at 54 (Shāfi īʿ: temporary marriages are void because divorce, inheritance, and 
other characteristics of marriage are not present). 
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jurists appear to have been anxious about women being able to end marriages 
without going to court; they made a woman’s status the subject of institutional 
oversight. 
In all the divorce types enumerated above, men or women pay a divorce 
settlement depending on which party was considered—by the court or customary 
norms—to be the breaching party. Generally, women who initiated or demanded 
divorce in the absence of judicially recognized justifications lost money in the 
divorce process. Between late antiquity and the middle ages, these judicially 
recognized justifications became more formalized. There is a substantive 
difference in how the exchange is abstracted: whereas earlier divorce was akin to a 
contract dissolution (modeled after ransoming or receiving an emancipation 
decree), in this period, divorce became a contractual breach (modeled after a 
market procedure or termination of a labor contract). Just as the employer-
employee relationship is a legally rationalized version of the master-slave 
relationship, so too is medieval divorce a judicially rationalized version of late 
antique divorce in the Near East. Market dynamics and property-ownership 
indisputably changed between late antiquity and the medieval era in ways that 
directly influenced the daily lives of women. While there is undoubtedly a 
connection between the region’s legal and economic history, these economic 
changes cannot be reconstructed with the available historical sources.197 It is 
possible that the changes enumerated here reflect broader shifts in the 
relationships between contract and property. 
Jurisprudential rhetoric about recalcitrant wives should be understood as 
disguising situations of women demanding divorces and using a variety of legal 
strategies to obtain a divorce. Restrictions on a wife’s ability to initiate a divorce 
created a fault-system of divorce that is familiar in a variety of other contexts.198 
Late medieval debates about Geonic practices were not unique, but rather reflect a 
socio-legal process that is evident in both Jewish and Islamic legal texts of the 
period: a wife’s ability to divorce her husband became more deeply embedded 
within legal procedures that complicated an older practice of women simply 
“paying” for a divorce. This process is discernible in the increasing emphasis on 
identifying one of the spouses as being “at fault” with the consequence of 
“paying” for the divorce. 
By appreciating that the relationship between these legal systems was one of 
a shared social space and historical tradition, we can begin to investigate what 
parallel legal transformations can tell us about their socio-political contexts. 
 
197. As Gordon has noted, “Because the economy is partially composed of legal relations, 
legal and economic histories are not histories of distinct and interacting entities but simply different 
cross-cutting slices out of the same organic tissue.” Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 57, 124 (1984); see also Ron Harris, The Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21 
LAW & HIST. REV. 297 (2003). 
198. Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1497, 1498–1500 (2000). 
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Muslim and Jewish jurists did not elaborate comparable legal schemata for divorce 
because they were building on similar scriptural texts or legal precedents—indeed, 
they were not. Nor did they “borrow” from the “influencing” legal system of the 
“other.” Instead, the schemata are essentially alike because they reflect the 
comparable customary practices, socio-political circumstances, and jurisprudential 
logic of Near Eastern legal culture. 
C. Speculating on the Interwoven Narrative 
I have presented a Judaic chronology, followed by an Islamic chronology, 
and then finally a Near Eastern story. I contend that the narrative of Near Eastern 
legal pluralism is a more exact and coherent interpretation of the historical 
evidence than the two preceding chronologies. Moreover, the interwoven 
narrative is not implicated in any particular self-justificatory or orthodox belief; it 
is then relatively more objective.199 The crux of the interwoven narrative is that 
changes occurred between the eighth and twelfth centuries that resulted in 
limitations on women’s abilities to initiate divorces.200 It should be noted that 
consumers of these legal systems likely demanded more judicial intervention as a 
means of clarifying domestic relationships that had significant financial 
implications (inheritance, post-divorce alimony, maintenance, etc.). But without 
sources that give “voice” to these consumers, it is difficult to reconstruct how, 
why, or when they sought court involvement in marriage and divorce. 
Consequently, these micro-histories offer limited explanations and it is necessary 
to consider the macro-context of this case study on wife-initiated divorce. The 
historical sources do demonstrate that whereas in late antiquity women had more 
flexibility to simply divorce their husbands without state (whether Byzantine, 
Sasanian, or, later, Islamic) involvement, by the medieval era divorce had become 
a state-dominated procedure. I want briefly to consider what broad political and 
social processes shaped this legal change. 
In both legal systems, the role of jurists in declaring divorces intensified and 
jurists thereby staked more control for themselves and, by extension, for 
husbands.201 In late antiquity, divorce often occurred without judicial intervention: 
Jewish men delivered notarized divorce decrees and Muslim men pronounced an 
oral divorce statement, but neither procedure necessarily necessitated court 
registration or involvement; Jewish or Muslim women simply left the homes of 
 
199. I define objectivity in post-foundationalist terms. Bevir asserts that “[h]istorians can 
justify their theories by showing them to be objective, where objectivity arises not out of a method, 
nor a test against pure facts, but rather a comparison with rival theories.” MARK BEVIR, THE LOGIC 
OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 104 (1999). 
200. Not coincidentally, more historical evidence survives from the twelfth century than from 
the eighth century. This certainly has an effect on how we perceive historical change, but the changes 
enumerated here do not appear to be fabrications of the historical evidence. 
201. Among Western Jews, however, there is an exception: Rabbeinu Gershom (d. 1028 CE) 
in Germany “enacted a decree which made it impossible for a husband to divorce his wife against her 
will.” RISKIN, supra note 25, at xii 109. 
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their husbands and refused to return.202 But in the medieval era, local courts—
proliferating throughout the empire—gradually came to process most divorces. 
The courts, in turn, were staffed by jurists who were being trained in religious 
institutions of learning that were steadily becoming more technical and 
bureaucratic. The informal legal circles and networks of the late antique period 
were transformed into the grand academies of learning that dictated the form and 
substance of legal education.203 The hundreds of legal schools that existed at the 
beginning of Islamic history consolidated into the several that came to dominate 
in the medieval era; likewise, numerous Jewish sects disappeared as rabbinic 
Judaism came to ascendancy. While the diversity of academies of learning 
preserved some of the region’s legal plurality, the boundaries between legal 
orthodoxy and legal heresy were being defined ever more narrowly. These changes 
in the transmission of knowledge and identification of religious authority were 
occurring simultaneously among Muslims and Jews in the Near East. 
What the interwoven narrative further indicates is that modifications in a 
woman’s access to divorce is one site where we can witness Jewish and Muslim 
jurists responding to regional, socio-economic and political changes. In both legal 
systems, the notion that the breaching party should suffer a financial loss underlies 
the medieval juristic discourse on divorce. Changes in women’s financial 
autonomy likely corresponded to their ability to initiate divorce by paying out 
divorce settlements. But the available historical evidence does not permit a clear 
analysis of the economic changes that accompanied the legal changes described 
here. As previously mentioned, the medieval processes of urbanization and 
commercialization—and their effects on law—cannot be easily measured. 
Likewise, it is unclear if a demographic shift in the number or age of men resulted 
in increased limitations on women’s divorce options or protection of men’s status; 
for instance, there may have been an interest in preventing women from divorcing 
their husbands while the latter were away at war. There are many questions that 
cannot be answered. 
But there is a specific question for which we can articulate a relatively 
substantive answer: how did the legal profession change? Broad transformations 
in the state and in religious institutions had concrete consequences for the legal 
profession. Recent research has revealed not only that the number of judges 
increased, but also that their salaries doubled in the mid-eighth century as the 
ʿAbbāsid Empire (750–1258 CE) began a gradual process of systematizing and 
centralizing its empire.204 These ʿAbbāsid judges received higher salaries because 
 
202. While papyri of marriage contracts survive from the late antique Islamic period, I was 
unable to locate divorce documents in the Arabic Papyrology Database. This could be an accident of 
historical survival, but I suspect it reflects that divorce was less institutionalized in late antiquity than 
in the medieval era, from which both marriage and divorce documents survive. 
203. See Salaymeh, supra note 84. See also my co-authored pieces on Islamic legal history in 
IRA M. LAPIDUS, ISLAMIC SOCIETIES TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2012). 
204. See generally Wadād al-Qāḍī, The Salaries of Judges in Early Islam: The Evidence of the 
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the empire was more prosperous, there was greater demand for judicial services, 
and these judges had more training than their predecessors. This legal 
professionalization resulted from the growing strength and diffusion of 
institutions of religious learning and training, which appointed or designated 
jurists for both Muslim and Jewish subjects.205 Judges transformed a late antique 
practice of divorce as mediation into a medieval practice of divorce as judicial 
procedure. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The syncretic framework presented here emphasizes understanding legal 
systems as multivalent and dynamic systems embedded in and inseparable from 
social contexts. Through historicization and contextualization, this mode of 
inquiry contests the reification of religions that leads to false assumptions about 
the religion’s “essence” or “primordial nature.” Religious communities, like all 
communities, are the products of their contexts and cannot be understood as 
transhistorical (or universal) categories.206 
The reader may wonder how medieval legal opinions and procedures are 
relevant to contemporary realities, considering the myriad socio-political and legal 
changes of the early modern and modern periods. Beyond the precedential value 
of these jurisprudential ideas, their canonical status keeps them germane. The 
Islamic chronology of wife-initiated divorce can be concisely continued: The Iraqi-
based Ḥanafī school—one of the four surviving orthodox Sunnī schools of law 
that became dominant during the medieval period—provided women with the 
fewest divorce options;207 this school became the official legal school of the 
Ottoman empire, whose family law codes are the basis of family laws in 
contemporary Middle Eastern states.208 In the early modern period, Ottoman 
court records attest to the common practice of women paying for divorces.209 
Divorce law reforms during the twentieth century in the Middle East primarily 
 
Documentary and Literary Sources, 68 J. NEAR EASTERN STUD. 9 (2009) (examining evidence of increases 
in judicial salaries). 
205. See my encyclopedia article, Salaymeh, supra note 84, and co-authored pieces in LAPIDUS, 
supra note 203. 
206. As Asad has noted, “[A] transhistorical definition of religion is not viable.” ASAD, supra 
note 9, at 30. 
207. The H ̣anafī school recognized sexual impotence as the primary grounds for a woman to 
initiate divorce, but (unlike the other three orthodox schools of law) permitted women to include 
marriage contract stipulations that would facilitate their divorce demands. See supra text accompanying 
note 122; see also JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 53 (2d ed. 2001). 
208. See supra text accompanying note 122; see also Leila Ahmed, Early Islam and the Position of 
Women: The Problem of Interpretation, in WOMEN IN MIDDLE EASTERN HISTORY 58, 61 (Nikki R. 
Keddie & Beth Baron eds., 1991). 
209. “In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, hul (Arabic khulʿ), divorce, whereby a wife 
materially compensates her husband in exchange for his consent to divorce, was a common practice 
in the empire from Istanbul to Cairo and points in between.” Madeline C. Zilfi, Muslim Women in the 
Early Modern Era, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF TURKEY: THE LATER OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 
1603–1839, at 226, 247 (Suraiya N. Faroqhi ed., 2006). 
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modified Ḥanafī doctrines.210 In recent years, several states have facilitated judicial 
divorce decrees under the doctrine of khulʿ .211 
Similarly, the Judaic chronology of wife-initiated divorce can be briefly 
continued: Post-medieval rabbinic authorities viewed coercing a husband to 
divorce a recalcitrant wife as an “innovation” resulting from “outside (i.e., Islamic) 
influence” and therefore rejected it.212 But even in the early modern era, Jewish 
women relinquished their financial rights to acquire divorces in Ottoman courts.213 
Modern Jewish courts follow Western Rishonim in effectively denying wives the 
ability to divorce their husbands without specific grounds.214 Contemporary laws 
are based not simply on “authoritative” or “orthodox” precedents, but on 
ideologically-based interpretations of legal history.215 I have attempted to 
demonstrate that these gradual historical processes were contingent, not 
inevitable.216 While some may choose to use historicism as a normative legal 
strategy, specific doctrinal changes will likely be unsuccessful if they are not 
coupled with deep understandings of legal-historical changes and the power 
dynamics underlying them. 
Understanding the porous frontier between Jewish and Islamic legal systems 
necessitates combining thick descriptions of law with historically contextualizing 
narratives.217 Late antique Jewish and Muslim jurists continued, modified, and 
practiced Near Eastern legal pluralism. Conventional models of comparative legal 
studies assume clear boundaries between legal systems; this assumption does not 
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211. Lynn Welchman, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE: First Time Family Law Codifications in Three Gulf 
States, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW: 2010 EDITION 163, 169–71, (William 
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212. Libson, supra note 56, at 99. 
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supra note 209, at 247. 
214. Riskin claims: 
Rabbenu Tam’s reading of the Talmudic texts, notwithstanding its universal acceptance by 
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woman to free herself from an intolerable marriage; there are sufficient legal grounds to do 
so, and it is up to the contemporary halakhic community to grant the woman her proper 
due. 
RISKIN, supra note 25, at xiii–xvi, 108; see also Westreich, supra note 3, at 207 (“The ruling now 
prevalent is that a woman initiating divorce proceedings according to Jewish law is required to submit 
a ground, chosen from a defined list appearing in the Talmud; barring such a ground, the husband 
cannot be coerced to grant a divorce.”). 
215. Avishalom Westreich’s extensive research into wife-initiated divorce “reveal[s] the 
ideological nature of the controversy regarding the right to divorce.” Avishalom Westreich, The Right 
to Divorce in Jewish Law: Between Politics and Ideology, 1 INT’L J. JURISPRUDENCE FAM. 177, 178 (2010). 
216. This is the objective of genealogy. See generally Bevir, What is Geneology?, supra note 8. 
217. In other words, I seek a balance between synchronic and diachronic explanations. See 
BEVIR, supra note 199, at 252 (explaining that “the synchronic and diachronic forms of explanation 
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correspond to the historical fluidity and porousness of Jewish and Islamic legal 
systems. This case study on a woman’s access to divorce has demonstrated the 
significance of both comparative and historical examination of doctrinal issues, 
but the implications for social identity are countless.218 In both Jewish and Muslim 
traditions, identity is intimately intertwined with law; consequently, challenging 
hermetic presumptions of each legal system by demonstrating their integrated 
histories contests essentialized identity claims. An anti-essentialist understanding 
of law will facilitate exploring the dialectical interchange between these legal 
systems, thereby illuminating the cultural and situational contexts in which laws 
are formulated from their antecedents—customary practices.219 
The evaluation of historical evidence by jurists, laypeople, and historians of 
both Jewish and Islamic legal systems is deeply embedded within an inherited 
tradition of unchallenged presumptions. In presenting this historical evidence, I 
have attempted to illustrate how contemporary understandings of law are 
entangled within orthodox narrative assumptions. In so doing, I have chosen to 
elucidate aspects of Jewish and Islamic legal historiography silenced by orthodoxy. 





















218. Glenn observes: “Recognition and acceptance of the diverse legal traditions of the world 
has implications for the identities which people in the world give themselves. Recognition of other 
traditions as partially your own means adhering, however partially, to those traditions. It means 
identifying with them in some measure. Identity then becomes less clear . . . .” H. PATRICK GLENN, 
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 378 (4th ed. 2010). 
219. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 889–90 (1988). 
           
64 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:19 
 
 
 
